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Chinese Legal Development




China is both a recipient and a donor of foreign
development aid. As a donor state, China insists that it does not
interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states, and it criticizes
Western human rights conditionality and rule of law advocacy
in development cooperation. Due to this non-interventionist
posture, Chinese foreign development aid is commonly seen to
exclude politically sensitive assistance for governance
institutions and the legal sector in particular. This Article
demonstrates that Chinese foreign development aid does, in fact,
include a legal component. Chinese legal development
assistance comprises advice on law reform in developing
countries; capacity-building programs for lawyers from
developing countries; and regulatory compliance support for
Chinese companies operating in developing countries. Through
this aid, China does not advocate a specifically Chinese version
of the rule of law. This is not only an ideological choice but also
a commercially motivated decision: China's interests as an
investor are supported by Western-style legal institutions. More
fundamentally, China's idiosyncratic legal governance model
cannot be easily exported to foreign countries because of its
reliance on repressed, largely informal knowledge about the
desired relationship between the Communist Party and the legal
system.
Assistant Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. I thank Julia Au,
Daley Birkett, Nguyen Dinh Cung, Jacob Eisler, Pip Nicholson, Raymond Mallon, and
Teemu Ruskola for their help with this article. My research has been greatly assisted
by the generous help from a number of Chinese development experts and scholars. I
have promised these individuals anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the
subject of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
China is both a recipient and a donor of foreign development aid.
As a donor state, China primarily seeks to support commercially
viable infrastructural projects in developing countries. China insists
that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states, and
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it criticizes Western human rights conditionality and rule of law
advocacy in development cooperation. Due to this non-interventionist
posture, Chinese foreign development aid is commonly seen to
exclude politically sensitive assistance for governance reform. As
regards governance assistance to the legal sector, in particular, China
is seen as a recipient of foreign aid rather than as an exporter.'
This Article demonstrates that Chinese foreign development aid
(or "cooperation") does, in fact, include a distinct legal component.
Relying on scarce Chinese government sources and interviews of
Chinese development experts and legal scholars, this Article
describes the basic outlines of Chinese legal development assistance
to developing countries. 2 This Article shows that China provides
1. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), legal development projects undertaken by foreign donor states in China
amounted to USD 15.7 million in 2015. ORG. FOR ECON. DEV., OECD STATISTICS,
http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ [https://perma.cclYJ4L-A87T] (archived Oct. 23, 2017). For
Chinese foreign development assistance to developing countries (without a legal focus),
see generally DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON'S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN
AFRICA (2011); CHALLENGING THE AID PARADIGM: WESTERN CURRENTS AND ASIAN
ALTERNATIVES (Jens Stilhoff Sorensen ed., 2010); KENNETH KING, CHINA'S AID AND
SOFr POWER IN AFRICA (2013); CHARLES WOLF, JR., XIAO WANG & ERIC WARNER,
CHINA'S FOREIGN AID AND GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES: SCALE,
CONTENT, DESTINATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS (2013); YANBING ZHANG, JING GU &
YUNNAN CHEN, CHINA'S ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION:
THE STATE OF THE DEBATE (2015); David Haroz, China in Africa: Symbiosis or
Exploitation?, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 65 (2011); Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Trade,
Empires, and Subjects-China-Africa Trade: A New Fair Trade Arrangement, or the
Third Scramble for Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (2008); Timothy Webster,
China's Human Rights Footprint in Africa, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 626 (2013).
2. This Article refers to all law-related foreign development assistance either as
"legal development assistance" or as "rule of law aid." These two terms cover exactly
the same scope of activities (such as assistance for law drafting, the court system, and
the legal profession). However, there is a slight stylistic difference between these
terms. For a Western reader, the term "rule-of-law aid" suggests a connection between
Western-style "rule of law" and economic and social development. For this usage of the
term, see Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD, IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 6, 12-13 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). The
term "legal development assistance," in contrast, does not establish a semantic
connection to Western conceptions of the rule of law. As a consequence, the term 'legal
development assistance" is better suited for describing China's law-related
development assistance than the more specific "rule-of-law aid." The term 'legal
development assistance" has been used to describe Japan's law-related development
assistance. See Pip Nicholson & Teilee Kuong, Japanese Legal Assistance: An East
Asian Model of Legal Assistance and Rule of Law?, 6 HAGUE J. OF THE RULE OF L. 141,
149 (2015). To be sure, there are many other concepts that could be used to describe
law-related foreign development assistance. For instance, "legal technical assistance"
has been used to describe aid comprising: (i) technical assistance for the drafting of
laws and regulations and technical advice for substantive law reforms, (ii) support for
the court system and the legal profession, and (iii) assistance for the development of
legal information systems. Scott Newton, Law and Development, Law and Economics
and the Fate of Legal Technical Assistance, in LAWMAKING FOR DEVELOPMENT:
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(i) advice on law reform in developing countries; (ii) capacity-building
programs for lawyers from developing countries; and (iii) regulatory
compliance support for Chinese state-owned enterprises and private
companies operating in developing countries. Chinese legal
development assistance is a particularly visible part of China's
ambitious foreign policy project, the "Belt and Road Initiative," but it
predates this initiative and extends to countries that do not
participate in it. 3
To be sure, Chinese legal development assistance is marginal
compared to the rule-of-law projects undertaken by international
development organizations and large Western donor states.
Nevertheless, the resources spent on Chinese legal development
assistance seem comparable to rule-of-law aid from small European
donor states.4 China is particularly active in offering legal capacity-
building programs. Each year, the Chinese government provides
training courses and legal conferences to hundreds of foreign
lawyers.5 From a historical perspective, some aspects of Chinese legal
development assistance are comparable to the first flourishing of the
Law and Development movement in the United States in the 1960s
and 1970s.6
Although Chinese legal development assistance is small-scale,
even tentative efforts to export legal knowledge from China raise far-
reaching questions about the role of law in development assistance.
Why is China, a critic of Western human rights and rule of law
advocacy, setting up its own projects on legal development
assistance? Contemporary Western development policies stress the
instrumental and intrinsic importance of the rule of law for social and
economic development. ' Does China accept Western assumptions
about the rule of law in its development cooperation?8 Or does it
EXPLORATIONS INTO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE
PROJECTS 23-24, 37-38 (J. Arnscheidt et al. eds., 2008); see also John K. M. Ohnesorge,
Law and development orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 9, 29 (Gerald Paul McAlinn and Caslav Pejovic eds., 2012).
Assistance for "judicial reforms" (or "justice reforms") is a more-limited term, connoting
reforms in the court system. See Livingstone Armytage, Judicial reform in Asia: Case
Study of ADB'S Experience: 1990-2007, 3 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 70, 72 (2011).
3. See infra section III.A.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 179 and 248.
5. See infra notes 172 and 186 for training courses, and notes 176 and 179 for
legal conferences.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 249-252 and Lu Nan, "Yidai Yilu"
Changyi Zhong de Faldi Yizhi (Legal Transplants in the Belt and Road Initiative), 11(1)
TSINGHUA FAXUE (Tsinghua University Law Journal) 22, 31-32 (2017).
7. See U.S. AGENCY INT'L DEV. [USAID], USAID STRATEGY ON DEMOCRACY
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE 16 (2013); U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDPI, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 20 (2010); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017:
GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW 83 (2017).
8. Development organizations define the "rule of law" in various ways, but
many organizations define the concept as a combination of formal legality-meaning
laws that are general, prospective, clear and certain-and substantive notions of
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advocate a specifically "Chinese" approach to the relationship
between law and development, a possible alternative to the Western
"rule-of-law orthodoxy"?9 Does such an approach constitute part of a
new Chinese development model, which China's President Xi Jinping
now offers to "countries and nations who want to speed up their
development"?10 Chinese legal development assistance also influences
development policymaking in the United States and other Western
donor states. Western donors now face competition from China, not
only for economic development projects, but in legal development
assistance, too.
Many scholars and development experts are interested in the
idiosyncratic legal underpinnings of the Chinese development
experience. The ongoing backlash against globalization has called
into question the legal architecture of international trade and
domestic laws, which facilitate neoliberal economic policies. 11 In
contrast to the "Washington Consensus,"'2 the Chinese development
model is recognized for its protectionist measures and heavy state
justice, such as property rights and civil and political rights. See infra note 259. For the
distinction between formal and substantive rule of law conceptions, see BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 19 (2004). For the
definitions of the rule of law in the World Bank's practice, see Alvaro Santos, The
World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 266 (David M. Trubek
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). For the Chinese rule of law model advocated by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), see infra Part W.A. For a conceptual framework of
various Chinese rule of law models, see RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA's LONG MARCH
TOWARD RULE OF LAW 103-09 (2002). I have discussed Chinese rule of law conceptions
in SAMULI SEPPANEN, IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA: USEFUL PARADOXES (2016).
9. According to Frank Upham, the Western rule of law orthodoxy holds that
the rule of law, defined as formal legality, is necessary for economic growth. See Frank
Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 7 (Carnegie Endowment Rule of
Law Series, Democracy and the Rule of Law Project Working Paper No. 30, 2002).
Justifying this orthodoxy are deep-rooted conceptions about the relationship between
law and society. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States,
1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1073-74.
10. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Enters New Era: Xi, XINHUA (Oct
18, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/englishl2017-10/18/c_136688475.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5MQ9-SXDP] (archived Jan. 9, 2018).
11. See David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING
DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 19 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz
eds., 2013) [hereinafter LAW AND ECONOMICS].
12. The "Washington Consensus" refers to development policies advocating the
privatization of property rights and the liberalization of foreign direct investments. See,
e.g., John Williamson, Preface: A Short History of the Washington Consensus, 15 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 7, 10-11 (2009).
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intervention,1 3 as well as for its ambivalent approach to the rule of
law. 14
The Chinese approach to development has also been described as
self-consciously "pragmatic." Beijing is seen to promote incremental,
context-specific solutions, which are not derived from a uniform and
universally applied policy framework.15 The notion of pragmatism is
tied to the Chinese government's tolerance for legally ambiguous
practices, as well as to its anti-formalist approach to law. 16
The association between the seemingly successful Chinese
development model and the anti-formalist approach to law fits the
perception that heterogeneous ideas about law are replacing the
formalist preferences of the Washington Consensus.1 7 Development
experts have long argued that the commonsensical assumptions
about the beneficial nature of rule of law aid are elusive and ill
justified.1 8 Some development organizations, most notably the World
13. See infra text accompanying note 295.
14. See William P. Alford, Double-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and
Legitimacy in the People's Republic of China, 22 DAEDELUS 45, 61-62 (1993). A survey
of Chinese development policies, conducted jointly by Tsinghua University in Beijing
and the Institute of Development Studies in the United Kingdom, states that "[i]n
contrast to most Western states, China is not a country bound by Western rule of law."
ZHANG, Gu & CHEN, supra note 1, at 4.
15. See JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: NOTES ON THE NEW
PHYSICS OF CHINESE POWER 4 (2004). In substantive terms, the so-called "Beijing
Consensus" refers to policies that place an emphasis on poverty reduction and the
provision of social and economic stability at the expense of legal reforms and the
comprehensive protection of human rights. Id. at 23-24. For critical analysis, see
Michael W. Dowdle & Mariana Mota Prado, Dialogus de Beijing Consensus, in THE
BEIJING CONSENSUS?: How CHINA HAS CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15 (Weitseng Chen ed., 2017); Scott Kennedy, The Myth of
the Beijing Consensus, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 461 (2010).
16. The anti-formalist approach to law connotes a willingness to abstain from
formal legal rules and processes in a specific case in order to achieve a substantively
desirable outcome. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8634 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds.,
2001). This approach is "pragmatic" in the sense that it does not regard law's certainty
as an end in itself "but only as a means for bringing about the best results in the
present case." Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5
(1996). As Randall Peerenboom explains with regard to Chinese law, the Chinese
pragmatic conception of rights sees them as "another type of interest to be weighed
against other interests." PEERENBOOM, supra note 8, at 78.
17. See David Kennedy, Law and Development Economics: Toward a New
Alliance, in LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 11, at 19-22, 63. Kennedy describes neo-
liberal legal formalism as a preference for clear rules, which are meant to operate as
the antidote to official discretion. Id. at 45.
18. Legal reforms may, for instance, replace well-functioning informal social
networks without providing sufficiently efficient alternatives. Upham, supra note 9, at
32-33; see also Carothers, supra note 2, at 16; Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse
Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored "Rule of Law"
Reform Projects in the People's Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 64, 83
(2000).
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Bank, now extol the virtues of pragmatism and localism in the design
of legal reforms.'9
While such economic and political considerations might induce
the Chinese government to start promoting a pragmatic and
ambivalent approach to law in foreign countries, China is also one of
the largest investors in the world. As a consequence, China benefits
from the investor-friendly laws and international trade agreements
previously advocated under the Washington Consensus.2 0 Indeed, as
the United States has adopted a revisionist approach to globalization,
the Chinese leadership is positioning itself as the principal advocate
of trade liberalization. 21 In light of China's foreign commercial
interests, economic protectionism, heavy state intervention, and anti-
formalism no longer appear as self-evidently positive development
policies for the Chinese government-although China continues to
rely on these policies domestically. The question is whether the
Chinese government can reconcile its newly assumed global role with
its long-standing objections to Western rule-of-law promotion and its
ambiguous commitment to legal formalism at home and abroad."
The first step in answering this question is to establish some
elementary facts about the scale and nature of China's legal
development assistance. In many other jurisdictions, this would be a
straightforward task. In China, gathering even basic information
about foreign development assistance presents a formidable
challenge. 23 Information about Chinese foreign development
assistance is considered a state secret. 24 Not even the highest
legislative organ in China, the National People's Congress, appears to
19. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 7, at 14-15.
20. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
[UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016 196-99 (2016). China has concluded 129
bilateral investment treaties. See Karl Sauvant, China, the G20 and the International
Investment Regime, 24 CHINA & WORLD ECONOMY 73, 77 (2016).
21. President Xi's speech to Davos in full, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-
world-economic-forum (last visited on Feb. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TL3N-FX68]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017).
22. For China's objections toward Western rule of law promotion, see Jing Gu
& Anthony Carty, China and African Development: Partnership not Mentoring, 45 IDS
BULLETIN SPECIAL ISSUE: CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 57, 60 (2014); for
the Chinese government's ambivalent approach to legal formalism, see PEERENBOOM,
supra note 8, at 218-219.
23. Establishing empirical facts is a common problem in Chinese studies. The
economist Yasheng Huang illustrates this problem as follows: "In studies of American
economy, scholars may debate about the effects of, say, 'Reagan tax cuts.' In studies of
the Chinese economy, the more relevant question would be, Did the government cut
taxes in the first place?" YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE xi (2008).
24. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 12.
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be able to obtain detailed information about development spending
from the Chinese government. 25 When the Chinese government
releases information about its foreign development assistance, it most
likely underreports its development projects abroad.26
The Chinese government has released some information about
its development programs-most notably, two white papers on
China's foreign aid in 2011 and 2014-but these documents are
cursory and mostly silent on legal development assistance.2 7 Legal
development assistance is a particularly sensitive topic for the
Chinese government, which has long insisted that Chinese
development assistance is non-ideological.28 Academic scholarship on
Chinese legal development assistance is scarce both in China and
abroad,2 9 and Chinese government officials are generally unwilling to
discuss the details of Chinese development programs with a foreign
researcher.3 0
Still, some information can be found on China's legal
development assistance programs. This Article benefits from
discussions with ten Chinese individuals who are involved with
Chinese development assistance as development experts or as
scholars.3 1 It is also possible to talk to foreign participants in Chinese
legal capacity-building programs (provided that one is able to identify
such individuals). This Article makes use of information and course
materials obtained from three foreign participants in Chinese legal
25. ZHANG, Gu & CHEN, supra note 1, at 15.
26. Xiaofang Shen, Private Chinese Investment in Africa: Myths and Realities
12 (The World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 6311).
27. Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China,
China's Foreign Aid (2011), http://english.gov.cnlarchive/white-paper/2014/09/09/
content_281474986284620.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XZ3V-
ZBDT] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter 2011 White Paper]; Information Office of
the State Council, The People's Republic of China, China's Foreign Aid (2014),
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white-paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9F4A-Z3BC] (archived Oct. 23, 2017)
[hereinafter 2014 White Paper].
28. Li Anshan, China and Africa: Policy and Challenges, 3 CHINA SEC. 69, 74
(2007).
29. There are a few English language studies explicitly addressing the role of
law in Chinese development policy. See Yonghong Hong, Trade, Investment and Legal
Cooperation between China and Africa, in CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
CHINA IN AFRICA 85 (Axel Harneit-Sievers et al. eds., 2010); Salvatore Mancuso, China
in Africa and the Law, 18 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 243 (2012). Chinese legal
scholars have begun to discuss legal development assistance in the context of the Belt
and Road Initiative. See Lu Nan, supra note 6, and infra note 147.
30. This is a common problem in the study of development policy in Asia. See
Asif H. Qureshi, China/Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Critical National and
International Law Policy Based Perspective, 14 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 777, 785 (2015).
31. The interviews took place in Beijing and Hong Kong between June, 2016
and June, 2017. The interviewees were promised anonymity due to the sensitive
subject area of this Article. To the extent possible, this Article cites written sources for
information and views on Chinese foreign legal development assistance.
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training courses. 32 Finally, Chinese government agencies and
newspapers have released some information about Chinese
development programs. This information is useful for piecing together
and corroborating information received from Chinese development
experts and foreign lawyers. Working papers published by the
International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC), a research
center established by the Chinese government to share Chinese
development experience with developing countries,33 are particularly
helpful for illustrating Chinese development experts' (often implicit)
attitudes toward law.
On the basis of this no doubt incomplete information, it is
possible to form a general image of the aims and impediments of
Chinese legal development assistance. Part I of this Article
demonstrates that legal development assistance is marginal in the
overall context of Chinese foreign development assistance. In contrast
to Western development aid, Chinese foreign development assistance
focuses on infrastructure projects and is often commercially
motivated.3 4
Part II describes the marginal role of law in Chinese foreign
development assistance in more detail. This Part demonstrates that
law is not only marginal in the Chinese government's foreign
development assistance programs, but that the Chinese government
and companies tolerate and even thrive in legally ambiguous
environments. Yet, owing to China's role as an investor, the Chinese
government is increasingly vocal about advocating formal legal
protections in developing countries.
Part III describes the modalities of Chinese legal development
assistance. This Part accounts for the few publicly available instances
of Chinese support for law reform in developing countries. It also
describes Chinese legal capacity-building programs, which are
currently the most significant form of Chinese legal development
assistance. Finally, this Part describes regulatory compliance support
32. The materials are from the First China-Africa Legal Professionals
Exchange Project, Sept. 1-Sept. 30, 2014, and the Third China-Africa Legal
Professionals Exchange Project, May 29-Jun. 11, 2016. The three interviewees were
promised anonymity. Obviously, this sample size is too small to draw conclusions about
the effects of Chinese legal training courses. Such conclusions must be left for future
studies.
33. See INTERNATIONAL POVERTY REDUCTION CENTER IN CHINA (IPRCC),
MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.iprce.org/Index/skip/lid/130.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/33UM-39WY] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
34. Tellingly, Chinese development assistance is administered by the Chinese
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) rather than by the Chinese Ministry for Foreign
Affairs or by a specialized development cooperation ministry. WOLF, XIAO & WARNER,
supra note 1, at 12; 2011 White Paper, supra note 27.
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provided by the Chinese government for Chinese companies operating
abroad.
Part IV asks whether Chinese legal development assistance
poses an ideological challenge to Western rule-of-law aid. This Part
argues that, while the Chinese legal development assistance presents
a potentially disruptive influence to Western rule-of-law aid, the
interests of the Chinese government and the ideological predilections
of Chinese development experts are too diverse to constitute a
coherent ideological challenge against the (as such elusive) Western
notions of the rule of law.3 5 Chinese foreign development assistance
seems to promote no coherent Chinese rule of law model-or any
other approach to the relationship between law and development.
This conclusion is in line with the accounts of the purposefully
non-ideological nature of Chinese foreign policy and the "Beijing
Consensus," which is typically described as pragmatic
experimentalism.3 6 The Chinese development model consists of the
pragmatic assumption that that there are no exportable development
models. However, the absence of a clearly articulated Chinese rule-of-
law model is not only a political choice but also a function of China's
idiosyncratic state structure and the central role of the Communist
Party in the Chinese legal system. Ultimately, the Communist
Party's legal governance model cannot be easily exported to foreign
countries because of its reliance on repressed, largely informal
knowledge about the desired relationship between the Communist
Party and the legal system.
Nevertheless, some argumentative strategies in Chinese
development cooperation are effective in legitimizing Chinese
developmental and commercial activities abroad. Perhaps
counterintuitively, the Chinese development experts' practice of
acknowledging the self-interested nature of Chinese development
assistance is well received among the elites in developing countries.
Moreover, in conjunction with China's considerable economic success
and the large scale of Chinese entrepreneurial projects in developing
countries, the marginal and tentative nature of Chinese legal
development assistance programs teaches a lesson about the relative
unimportance of law for economic development.
35. This is not to imply that Western development policies are coherent-they
are not. See, e.g., Santos, supra note 8, at 275-76; see also Samuli Seppinen, From
Substance to Absence: Argumentative Strategies in the Implementation of the Human
Rights-Based Approaches to Development, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 389, 429 (2017)
(criticizing the incoherence of Western policy frameworks on the human rights-based
approach).
36. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 308; Dowdle & Prado, supra note 15, at 39;
RAMO, supra note 15 at 4.
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II. CHINESE FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: AN OVERVIEW
As the starting point of this Article, it is helpful to compare the
scale and nature of China's overall foreign development assistance
with Western foreign development aid. A key distinguishing feature
in this comparison concerns support to governance institutions,
including the legal sector. The nature of Chinese foreign development
assistance makes support to the legal sector appear less essential to
the Chinese government than to Western donor states.
A. Small Donor, Large Development Financier
For the uninitiated, the large scale of Chinese foreign
development assistance may seem surprising. International
development finance provided by Chinese development banks is
roughly comparable to the total lending of the most important
Western-based lending institutions. 37 Moreover, far from being a
recent pursuit, China's interest in foreign development assistance
predates its rise to (moderate) economic prosperity. Even by Western
standards, China was an early participant in international
development cooperation.3 8 The roots of Chinese foreign aid can be
traced back to the ancient tributary system,39 and the influence of
Chinese law in East Asia has a long history.40 In the modern sense,
Chinese foreign aid started in the mid-1950s.41 Estimates about the
volume of Chinese aid during the Cold War vary, but most estimates
put the total figure in the billions of US dollars.42 The volume of
China's aid during the Cold War was less than development aid from
the United States and the Soviet Union, but it was, nonetheless,
37. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
38. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 33. For the beginnings of post-colonial
development aid in the West, see JAMES CYPHER & JAMES DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 68-95 (2009). China's experience is not, however, unique.
Finland started its first development project in 1962 when it was still a net recipient of
development assistance. See Eventful History of Finnish Development Cooperation,
Kepa, http://itseopiskelu.kepa.fi/node/428 (last visited on Feb. 6, 2017)
[https://perma.cclP382-779A] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
39. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 234.
40. Teemu Ruskola, The East Asian Legal Tradition, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 257, 264 (2012) (pointing out that the Tang Code,
promulgated in the seventh century CE, was "used as a model in Korea, Japan, and
Vietnam").
41. See WOLFGANG BARTKE, CHINA'S ECONOMIC AID 16 (1975).
42. The CIA estimates that the total Chinese foreign aid from 1960 to 1989
amounted to $9.66 billion. JOHN F. COPPER, CHINA'S FOREIGN AID AND INVESTMENT
DIPLOMACY: VOL 1: NATURE, SCOPE, AND ORIGINS 29-30 (2016). This conforms to the
estimate in the 2011 White Paper. See 2011 White Paper, supra note 27.
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remarkably high given China's economic condition at the time.43
China supported agricultural projects in Africa as millions of its own
citizens perished of famine at home.44 In the 1960s and 1970s, China
even provided development aid to two European countries, Albania
and Malta.45 Until China's economic reforms took off in the 1980s,
two-thirds of China's aid recipients had higher per capita incomes
than China.46
Chinese foreign development assistance remains large for a
developing country. The precise scale of this assistance is difficult to
establish since China does not adhere to the same reporting
standards on foreign development assistance as Western countries,
set by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. 47
Nevertheless, according to an OECD estimate, China's concessional
development aid reached USD 3.4 billion in 2014.48 This is a fraction
of development aid donated by the three largest donor states: the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 49 China's
concessional development aid is also significantly less than the
43. BARTKE, supra note 41, at 20.
44. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 33.
45. BARTKE, supra note 41, at 79, 134.
46. COPPER, supra note 42, at 14.
47. Western donor states-most notably, the United States, the United
Kingdom and Germany-are members of the OECD DAC. DAC measures foreign
development assistance through the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA),
which provides a set of criteria to determine whether foreign development assistance is
sufficiently concessional to qualify as ODA. DAC defines ODA as "transfers of
resources" or "flows" to countries and multilateral institutions that are "provided by
official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies;
and . . . each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b)
is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). The discount rate is a "notional
reference rate of 10 per cent per annum." While commercial interest rates are generally
below ten percent, the OECD states that the required amount, 25% of the loans, "must
still be concessional in character, i.e. below market interest rates" in order to qualify as
ODA. OECD, IS IT ODA? FACTSHEET-NOVEMBER 2008 1, 3 (2008) [hereinafter OECD
ODA]. China is not a member of the OECD and, unlike some countries, it does not
report its development assistance statistics using DAC criteria. According to Deborah
Brautigam, China calculates military assistances and certain joint venture
investments as foreign development assistance. These expenditures would not
constitute ODA according to the DAC rules. However, Chinese external assistance
budget excludes scholarships offered for foreign students studying in China. These
would be ODA under the DAC rules. See Deborah Brautigam, Aid With Chinese
Characteristics'- Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC
Aid Regime, 23 J. INT'L DEV. 752, 756 (2011).
48. OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT 2016, at 296 (2016).
49. The largest individual donor, the United States, donated USD 31.1 billion
as ODA in 2015. Id. at 275. The United Kingdom, the second largest individual donor,
donated USD 18.7 billion in the same year, and Germany, the third largest donor state,
USD 17.8 billion. Id. at 199, 271.
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development aid donated by Canada and Sweden.50 It is, however,
roughly equal to development aid from Australia,5 ' and more than
what Belgium, Denmark, and Finland each donated.52 As for other
developing countries, the OECD estimates that China's concessional
aid is multiple times larger than the development aid from Brazil,53
Chile,54 and India.5 5
China's concessional aid program does not, in other words, strike
as particularly large in comparison to Western countries. Although
China has donated highly visible pieces of infrastructure to
developing countries, such as sports stadiums and hospitals, it does
not provide sustained support on the scale of large Western donor
states. 56 The impact of Chinese concessional development aid is
further reduced by its more or less even allocation among China's
development partners. 57 Moreover, China's aid infrastructure is
rudimentary. There is no specialized Chinese development agency,
and the Chinese embassy staff members charged with the
management of development projects are generally not experts in
development cooperation.58
Nevertheless, comparisons between OECD-compatible
development aid from different countries belie the true scale of
Chinese foreign development assistance. Whereas the OECD criteria
emphasize the concessional nature of development assistance-that
is, they only take into account gifts and low interest rate loans-much
of Chinese foreign assistance takes place within the broader
intersection of foreign aid, commercial enterprise, and international
politics. Development finance offered by Chinese export banks, most
notably the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import
Bank of China (ExIm Bank), is a key element of this assistance. Some
50. Canada's ODA amounted to USD 4.3 billion in 2015. Id. at 175. Sweden's
ODA reached USD 7.1 billion in the same year. Id. at 263.
51. The amount of Australian ODA was USD 3.2 billion in 2015. Id. at 163.
52. Belgian ODA amounted to USD 1.9 billion in 2015. Id. at 171. Denmark
donated USD 2.6 billion as ODA in the same year and Finland USD 1.3 billion. Id. at
183, 191.
53. The most recent OECD estimate for ODA from Brazil, USD 500 million, is
from 2010. Id. at 293.
54. This amount was USD 49 million in 2014. Id. at 294.
55. This amount was USD 1.4 billion in 2014. Id. at. 298. Relative to the size of
its economy, however, China donates less than India. In 2014 (and in 2015), the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of China, USD 11 trillion, was more than five times that of
India (USD 2 trillion), whereas concessional development aid from China was only
about twice that from India in 2014. Id. at 296, 298; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
[IMF], World Economic Outlook Database, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2016/02/weodatalindex.aspx [https://perma.cc/PSP8-24PV] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
56. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 73, 118.
57. OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT 2016, supra note 48, at 303.
58. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 109; see also KING, supra note 1, at 152.
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projects financed by the Chinese development banks are entirely
commercial, whereas others include concessional elements, such as
zero-interest loans and export buyer's credit.59 Concessional oans can
be secured against, for instance, income from the exportation of
natural resources.60
While the terms of Chinese development finance are not entirely
comparable with the loan terms of international development banks,
it is estimated that CDB has overtaken the World Bank as a global
development financier. Together with ExIm Bank, the combined
assets of the two Chinese development banks are just behind the
combined assets of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank,
InterAmerican Development Bank, European Investment Bank,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and African
Development Bank.61
B. Turn-Key Projects instead of Support for Governance Institutions
The nature of Chinese development finance amplifies its effects.
Chinese development banks typically fund complete "turn-key"
projects, such as factories, mines, farms, ports, and roads. In these
projects, the Chinese side takes an active role in designing and
constructing the pieces of infrastructure, typically sending engineers
and technical personnel to the project site. Once the project is
complete, the Chinese government hands over the entire piece of
infrastructure to the recipient country.62
According to the 2011 White Paper, such turn-key projects are
the principal modality of Chinese development aid, accounting for 40
percent of Chinese foreign aid expenditure. 63 The Chinese
government offers these projects as package deals, in which the
Chinese side provides financing and technical expertise to the
developing country and receives raw materials, such as oil and
aluminum, in return. 64 Many of these projects are initiated by
Chinese state-owned or private enterprises, which look for new
59. Export buyer's credit is a loan offered to a foreign purchaser of Chinese
goods. CHINA EXIM BANK, PREFERENTIAL FACILITIES, http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/
tmlen-TCN/index_640.html (last visited on Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8ZLL-
S4AR] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
60. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 176-177.
61. James Kynge, China becomes global leader in development finance, FIN.
TIMES (May 18, 2016), http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001067623/ce [https://perma.cc/
F5ZP-HWRD] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
62. See 2011 White Paper, supra note 27.
63. Id.
64. Aid 'With Chinese Characteristics, supra note 47, at 757-59; SERGE
MICHEL & MICHEL BEURET, CHINA SAFARI: ON THE TRAIL OF BEIJING'S EXPANSION IN
AFRICA 9 (2008).
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markets in developing countries 65 or seek government-financed
infrastructural projects to support their foreign business operations.66
Despite such commercial motives, Chinese development finance
is very attractive for governments in developing countries, especially
since such assistance is generally not available from Western donor
states. Instead of agricultural and industrial turn-key projects,
Western donor states nowadays prefer to focus on supporting social
and administrative infrastructure, such as education, health, water
and sanitation, government institutions (including the legal sector),
and economic infrastructure (such as transportation and
telecommunication). Support for social, administrative, and economic
infrastructure comprises about one-third of OECD DAC members'
development expenditure.6 7 Chinese-style support for production-
including support to agriculture, industry, mining, and
construction-accounts only for 7 percent of DAC members'
development spending.68
It is also noteworthy that some Western development aid is tied
to specific conditions.6 9 Some of these conditions relate to political
reforms, such as democratic reforms and the improvement of a
country's human rights conditions; 70 other conditions concern
economic reforms and benchmarks, setting, for instance, a maximum
level for government borrowing or requiring the elimination of price
controls. 71 The Chinese government is adamant that it does not
impose political or economic conditions on aid recipients.72
65. See Jing Gu, China's Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for
African Development, 24 EUR. J. OF DEV. STUD. 570, 574-775 (2009).
66. Shen, supra note 26, at 23, 27.
67. This figure refers to ODA flows. OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
REPORT 2015 317 (2015). These figures are not available in the most recent OECD
Development Cooperation Report. See generally OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
REPORT 2016, supra note 48.
68. This figure refers to ODA flows. OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
REPORT 2015, supra note 67, at 317.
69. A more benign term for the conditions is "accountability mechanisms." Id.
at 68.
70. Peter Uvin, 'Do as I Say, not as I Do'. The Limits of Political Conditionality,
5 EUR. J. OF DEV. RES. 63 (1993). For human rights conditionality, see generally
LORAND BARTELS, HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN THE EU's INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS (2005); Piivi Leino, European Universalism?-The EU and Human
Rights Conditionality, 24 Y.B. EUR. L. 329 (2005).
71. See IMF, IMF CONDITIONALITY 2-3 (2016), http://www.imf.org/About/
Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/21/28/IMF-Conditionality?pdf=1 (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/8GEZ-C9VD] (archived Oct. 23, 2017); see also IMF,
GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY (2002), http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/
eng/guid/092302.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8RPE-PCF4]
(archived Jan. 9, 2018).
72. See 2011 White Paper, supra note 27; see also Webster, supra note 1, at
651.
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But Chinese loans do come with some strings attached. Most
obviously, the People's Republic of China does not offer foreign
assistance to countries that fail to recognize the Beijing government
(as opposed to the government in Taiwan) as the legitimate
government of China under the "One China policy."73 The Chinese
government also requires that recipients of Chinese aid obtain much
of the requisite goods and services from Chinese companies (which
may, however, subcontract local companies for this end).74 Finally, as
discussed in Part II.A below, some Chinese development projects
have been conditioned on legislative amendments.75
To be sure, there is much criticism of the Chinese approach to
foreign development assistance. China's development assistance is
thought to be motivated by a non-altruistic strategy to secure natural
resources.76 Drawing on a database of Chinese-financed projects, a
World Bank study noted in 2009 that "[m]ost Chinese government
funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed at
securing a flow of Sub-Saharan Africa's natural resources for export
to China."7 7 This strategy is not uniquely Chinese,7 8 and it is unclear
to what extent Chinese development assistance is driven by a motive
to secure resources. 7 Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable
geopolitical element to Chinese development assistance policy. The
most ambitious recent Chinese foreign policy strategy, the Belt and
Road Initiative, is explicitly promoted as a strategy to establish a
Chinese sphere of influence in Eurasia. 80 The self-interested,
73. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 150.
74. Id. at 152. Among DAC members over 80% of ODA is untied to their donor
counties. OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT 2015, supra note 67, at 168.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 115-117.
76. See ZHANG, Gu & CHEN, supra note 1, at 23; see also Patrick J. Keenan,
Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 84, 92, 98 (2009).
77. BUILDING BRIDGES: CHINA'S GROWING ROLE AS INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCIER FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 84 (Vivien Foster et al. eds., 2009).
78. A Japanese government white paper from 1958 stated that a goal of
Japanese foreign aid was to boost markets for Japanese products abroad and to secure
raw materials for Japan's import market. Jin Sato, Domestic Functions of Economic
Cooperation: Japan's Evolution as a Donor in the 1950s, in THE RISE OF ASIAN DONORS:
JAPAN'S IMPACT ON THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGING DONORS, 11, 15 (Jin Sato &
Yasutami Shimomura eds., 2012). During the Cold War, the socialist block criticized
Western governments for their alleged attempts to keep developing countries as
sources for raw materials. See JOSEPH S. BERLINER, SOVIET ECONOMIC AID: THE NEW
AID AND TRADE POLICY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 78 (1958).
79. In contrast to the above-mentioned World Bank study, Deborah Brautigam
has concluded that China does not, in fact, give more aid to African countries with
more resources than to other African countries. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 279;
BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 77.
80. This initiative promotes commerce and cultural exchanges among 60
Eurasian countries. See NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION, VISION
AND ACTIONS ON JOINTLY BUILDING SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND 21ST-CENTURY
MARITIME SILK ROAD (2015), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330
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commercial nature of Chinese legal development assistance does not
seem to diminish its value for the Chinese development experts. On
the contrary, they perceive the mutually beneficial nature of such aid
as its central justification.8 1 China's support for oppressive regimes
has also been seen as hurting democracy and human rights, as well
as impairing efforts to curb corruption in developing countries.82
Still, Chinese development assistance and finance undoubtedly
responds to a demand for agricultural and industrial turn-key
projects. 8 Moreover, Chinese development aid is not confined to
infrastructural projects alone. As with many other donor states,
China offers both short-term training programs for government
officials and vocational personnel and long-term educational
opportunities in masters' programs and PhD programs.84 Short-term
training programs organized by China are among the largest in the
world; in Africa alone, China plans to train forty thousand people
between 2016 and 2018.85 In addition to bringing officials and other
personnel to China, the Chinese government trains vocational and
technical personnel in their home countries. China operates
vocational training centers in Africa, providing training on
construction skills, engineering, architecture, electronics, and other
skills.86 This training is large scale: from 2016 to 2018, China plans to
train two hundred thousand vocational and technical personnel in
669367.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cclM9RZ-L992] (archived Oct.
23, 2017) [hereinafter NDRC].
81. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 98-99; see also Haroz, supra note 1, at 68.
82. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 277, 284, 292; WOLF, XIAO & WARNER, supra
note 1, at 49. It is, however, worth bearing in mind that Western countries provide aid
to regimes that they consider violators of human rights (such as Ethiopia). Brautigam
notes that Western countries and Eastern European countries have provided weapons
for countries such as Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at
290-91.
83. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Constructing Africa: Chinese Investment,
Infrastructure Deficits, and Development, 49 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 101, 114-125 (2016)
(describing infrastructure deficits in Africa). There are historical precedents for the
Chinese approach. Soviet foreign aid and Japanese aid programs were marked by a
focus on industrial development and infrastructural projects in the 1960s. See
BERLINER, supra note 78, at 64; CAROL LANCASTER, FOREIGN AID: DIPLOMACY,
DEVELOPMENT, DOMESTIC POLITICS 115 (2007).
84. IPRCC, IPRCC ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 24 (2016),
http://www.iprcc.org/Index/skip/cid/4818.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/AP7E-FJ3N] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
85. THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION JOHANNESBURG ACTION PLAN
(2016-2018), http://www.focac.org/eng/tdaldwjbzjjhys1/tl327961.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7H2L-LSXE] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) (Dec. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter JOHANNESBURG ACTION PLAN]. King notes that the largest provider of
short-term training programs, Germany, offers more than 10,000 training
opportunities in the world. KING, supra note 1, at 49.
86. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 158.
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Africa. 87 In universities, Confucius Institutes are a particularly
visible part of China's capacity-building programs. These institutes
provide language courses and facilitate student exchanges to China.8 8
Finally, it should be noted that Chinese and Western
development assistance policies are becoming increasingly similar.
China joined OECD members in their most recent comprehensive
declaration on the principles of development cooperation, the 2011
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. 89
Occasionally, China has partnered with Western development
organizations in the design of development policies. 90 Moreover,
China persuaded fifty-six countries (excluding the United States but
including most Western European countries and Australia) to join the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a development
institution meant to rival the US-based World Bank.9 1 AIIB has paid
some attention to the social and environmental aspects of
development projects.92
In certain ways, Western donor states also are adopting some
aspects of Chinese development policies. Western donor states and
international organizations are relaxing political and economic
conditions, and they have begun to emphasize the ability of
developing countries to choose their own development models,9 3 even
with regard to their legal institutions.94
87. JOHANNESBURG ACTION PLAN, supra note 85. The efficiency of these
trainings is questionable. Brautigam notes that the short-term training courses, which
form the vast majority of Chinese training programs, "are not linked to specific projects
and will do little to build capacity." BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 158.
88. KING, supra note 1, at 54-56.
89. The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation Declaration
comprises four principles: (i) the ownership of development priorities by developing
countries; (ii) a focus on results; (iii) the establishment of development partnerships;
and (iv) transparency and shared responsibility. China endorsed the principle in the
context of "South-South cooperation." See OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT
2015, supra note 67, at 53, 338.
90. Id. at 303. For an example of a policy report jointly prepared by OECD and
a Chinese development agency, see CHINA-DAC STUDY GROUP, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
FOUNDATION FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION (2010),
https://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/48555115.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/F7FZ-5QC8] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
91. Jane Perlez, China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015).
92. See infra text accompanying note 105.
93. According to the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation Declaration, "[c]ountries should define the development model that they
want to implement." OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION REPORT 2015, supra note 67,
at 338.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 270-275.
118 [VOL. 51:101
CHINESE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
III. THE ROLE OF LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
A. Qualified Resistance to Transnational Human Rights and Rule of
Law Standards
Because of its commercially motivated, project-based nature,
Chinese development assistance does not focus on governance reform,
which is one of the principal preoccupations of Western development
agencies. Important goals of Western development aid-the
strengthening of the rule of law and the improvement of human
rights conditions in developing countries-are largely absent from
Chinese development policy statements. The two Chinese white
papers on development assistance do not mention the "the rule of
law" or "human rights" at all.95 The marginality of law for Chinese
development policies is reflected in the regulation of Chinese foreign
development assistance-or ather, the lack of such regulation. In
contrast to many Western countries, there is no specific legislation on
development assistance in China.96
As far as law is mentioned in Chinese development policy texts,
it is usually in the context of sovereign equality and the argument
that all states have the right to choose their own development
model. 97 References to law also appear as criticism of Western-
imposed human rights conditionality. The 2009 Beijing Declaration of
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), for instance,
condemns the "the politicization of human rights and the imposition
of human rights conditionalities on economic assistance."9 8 These
complaints are part of China's long-standing objections toward
transnational governance standards allegedly imposed by Western
countries. As Jing Gu and Anthony Carty have pointed out,
transnational governance standards on the rule of law contradict the
horizontal nature of the Chinese ideal of international relations,
according to which "[n]o one stands in a position of authority over the
other."99
95. 2011 White Paper, supra note 27; 2014 White Paper, supra note 27. The
2011 White Paper mentions "law" only in relation to Chinese legislation on the control
of government spending. The 2014 White Paper is silent on the legal aspects of Chinese
development assistance, except for an intriguing reference to a project relating to
Benin's agricultural laws, which is discussed in Part III.A below.
96. ZHANG, Gu & CHEN, supra note 1, at 15.
97. See 2011 White Paper, supra note 27; 2014 White Paper, supra note 27.
98. FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (FOCAC), BEIJING DECLARATION
OF THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (Sept. 25, 2009),
http://www.focac.org/eng/1tdaldyjbzjhy/DOC12009/t6O6796.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cclYPV6-TTA3] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter 2009 Beijing
Declaration].
99. Gu & Carty, supra note 22, at 66.
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At the same time, the Chinese government maintains that it is
not opposed to the concepts of "the rule of law" and "human rights" as
such. The Chinese government sometimes resorts to universalist
human rights language. The abovementioned 2009 Beijing
Declaration, for instance, describes human rights conditions on
development aid as "a violation of human rights."10 0 Occasionally, the
Chinese government has also accepted, at least rhetorically, that
there exist international standards on the rule of law.10' In practical
terms, the Chinese government supports transnational governance
standards agreed within bilateral and multilateral frameworks, such
as the World Trade Organization. 102 Some Chinese government
entities nowadays view illegal conduct of Chinese companies
negatively.0 3 Even human rights promotion in developing countries
no longer appears as an unmitigated problem for the Chinese
government. AIIB, the Chinese-run development bank,104 explains
that the bank's "operations seek to be supportive of these human
rights and encourage respect for them."10 5
The Chinese government has also advocated legislative reforms
in developing countries in order to protect Chinese investments
abroad. In Africa, the Chinese government calls for "a steady and
reliable legal framework between China and Africa," and it wishes to
increase legal cooperation with its African partners.0 6 In Eurasia,
one of the aims of the Chinese government is to "push forward
100. 2009 Beijing Declaration, supra note 98.
101. The Chinese government White Paper on the Rule of Law states that the
rule of law is "the crystallization of human wisdom" and "desired and pursued by
people of all countries." P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL, CHINA'S EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW, foreword (Feb. 28, 2008),
http://www.china.org.cn/government/news/2008-02/28/content_11025486.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.ccNG2U-HWGE] (archived Oct. 23, 2017)
[hereinafter the White Paper on the Rule of Law].
102. See NDRC, supra note 80.
103. IPRCC, Corporate Social Responsibility of the Chinese Multinational
Enterprises 4 (Working Paper Series No. 11, 2012) (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
104. See AIIB, Quick Facts, https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html (last visited Sept.
2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5KYW-5BVX] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
105. AIIB, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, CONSULTATION DRAFT, 3
(Aug. 3, 2015). From the perspective of international development organizations and
many foreign scholars, such efforts are insufficient and marginal. See Letter from
Independent Experts and Special Rapporteurs, Office U.N. High Comm'r Hum. Rts., to
Jin Liqun, President-designate of the Multilateral Interim Secretariat of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/IEDebt/261015_LetterAIIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKL2-GCN8] (archived Oct.
23, 2017); AMNESTY INTL, SUBMISSION TO THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
BANK (AIIB) ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK CONSULTATION (ESF) (Oct.
2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior10/2736/2015/en/ [https://perma.cc/
58XW-F6NZ] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
106. FOCAC, DECLARATION OF THE JOHANNESBURG SUMMIT OF THE FORUM ON
CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltdal
dwjbzjjhys_1/hywj/tl327960.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cclKE5T-
S98L] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
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negotiations on bilateral investment protection agreements," which
are intended to "protect the lawful rights and interests of
investors."1 0 7
Still, the Chinese government stresses the politically
noninvasive nature of its development assistance. Wen Jiabao, the
former Chinese premier, explained the Chinese approach in 2006 as
follows:
China supports the development of democracy and rule of law in Africa. But we
never impose our own will on others. We believe that people in every region and
country have the right and ability to properly handle their own affairs.1 0
8
The non-interventionist approach was enshrined in the earliest
explanation of Chinese development policy, the Eight Principles for
Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries in
1964.109 According to the Eight Principles, China will not attach any
conditions to its aid or require any privileges for itself, nor will
experts dispatched by China to developing countries enjoy a higher
standard of living than the local experts.10 Keeping in line with the
Eight Principles, the two White Papers issued by the Chinese
government in 2011 and 2014 explain the motivation for China's
development activities in terms of friendly relations and cooperation
with other developing countries.111
Such assurances seem to reflect some aspects of Chinese
development assistance accurately.'1 2 However, it is also true that
Beijing rewards developing countries for supporting its diplomatic
positions. In addition to the above-described "One China" policy," 3
107. NDRC, supra note 80.
108. Transcript of Premier Wen's Press Conference in Cairo, XINHUA (Jun. 19,
2006), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/print.shtml?/newsrelease/commonnews/
200610/20061003343606 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5836-8XYY]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017). For President Xi Jinping's view on the international relevance
of the Chinese approach to development, see supra note 10.
109. See Zhou Enlai Announces Eight Principles of Foreign Aid, CHINA DAILY
(Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content_11149131.htm
(last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ED9P-D8RN] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
110. Id. The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to
Other Countries comprise: (i) the principle of equality and mutual benefit; (ii) the
unconditionality of aid; (iii) the provision of interest-free or low-interest loans; (iv) the
self-reliance of aid recipients; (v) a focus on projects that require little investments and
yield fast results; (vi) the provision of highest quality materials from China (vii); the
full transfer of Chinese technical expertise; and (viii) the pledge that the Chinese
experts would enjoy no higher standard of living than the local experts. Id.
111. See 2011 White Paper, supra note 27; 2014 White Paper, supra note 27.
112. According to Deborah Brautigam, her African interviewees asserted to her
that the Chinese government made no effort to convince them to adopt Chinese
development models. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 38.
113. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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the Chinese government has used development aid to reward
governments in its territorial disputes in the South China Sea.114
Moreover, the Chinese government is not above imposing legislative
requirements on developing countries in specific projects. This was
the case with a mining and infrastructure agreement between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and a group of Chinese
state-owned companies.1 5 The agreement between the DRC and the
Chinese companies included a requirement for the DRC to adopt
legislation that gave the Chinese companies the benefits of all
existing DRC regulations and the freedom to transfer funds abroad
free of charges and transfer controls."6 When the DRC Parliament
failed to adopt the requested legislation, the Chinese ExIm Bank
financing the project withdrew from the deal. The withdrawal
prompted a new round of negotiations between the Congolese and the
Chinese. The DRC Parliament finally adopted the requested
legislation and Exim Bank reinstated its financing." 7
B. Stage-based Narrative of Development
Since Chinese development policy statements and white papers
do not address law beyond references to (laudable) sovereign equality
and (regrettable) human rights conditionality, there exist no official
explanations for why law plays such a marginal role in Chinese
foreign development policy. Surveys of Chinese development policy by
Chinese scholars generally ignore this issue, at most drawing a
contrast between unconditional Chinese development aid and the
human rights conditions of Western development aid.118
114. Ben Paviour & Kuch Naren, After Sea Decision, Chinese Funds Flow In,
THE CAMBODIA DAILY (Jul. 16, 2016), https://www.cambodiadaily.comlnews/after-sea-
decision-chinese-funds-flow-in-115527/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/FY4P-GEFC] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
115. See Suzanne Siu, Note, The Sovereign-Commercial Hybrid: Chinese
Minerals for Infrastructure Financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 48
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 599 (2010).
116. Convention de collaboration entre la Rdpublique D6mocratique du Congo et
Le Groupement d'entreprises Chinoises: China Railway Group Ltd Sinohydro
Corporation relative au ddveloppement d'un projet minier et d'un projet
d'infrastructures en Republique Dbmocratique du Congo, art 15.1, Apr. 22, 2008,
http://static.tijd.be/pdf/congochina.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cclLA2V-MX6R] (archived Oct. 18, 2017); see also, Siu, supra note 115,
at 627-28.
117. See Johanna Jansson, China - DRC Sicomines Deal Back on Track, AFRICA
REPORT (Aug 4, 2012), http://www.theafricareport.com/Central-Africa/chinadrc-
sicomines-deal-back-on-track.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4J3V-
ABBE] (archived on Oct. 18, 2017). The Chinese government has, therefore, sought to
impose legal conditions on developing countries despite its emphasis on sovereignty.
118. See ZHANG, Gu & CHEN, supra note 1, at 10-11 (noting that Chinese
development policies diverge from Western development policies with regard to human
rights, democracy and good governance); Li Anshan, supra note 28, at 83 (describing
Western human rights-centered criticism of Chinese development policies). But see Lu
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The assumptions about law in Chinese development policy are,
thus, mostly implicit, and they must be inferred from the overall
context of Chinese development policy.1 19 It seems that there are two
main reasons for the marginality of law in Chinese foreign
development assistance. First, it appears that Chinese policy makers
and development practitioners conceptualize development as a stage-
based process, in which (advanced) legal institutions become relevant
only at the higher stages of development.120
The origins of the stage-based conception (or "narrative") of the
development process can be traced back to early Western
modernization theories.121 Under the stage-based model, some legal
regulations-say, import tariff schedules-are presumed to be helpful
for supporting the initial stages of economic development. 122
However, liberal legal institutions-Western-style civil and political
rights, for instance-become relevant only in the higher stages of
economic development.12 3
Under this model, adopting advanced institutions in the early
stages of a country's development process would not only be futile, as
society is not able to make use of such institutions, but it could also
Nan, supra note 6 (providing a comprehensive discussion on Chinese law and
development discourse in the Belt and Road Initiative).
119. My approach follows David Kennedy's discussion on the evolution of
Western development policies. See David Kennedy, The "Rule of Law," Political Choices
and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95,
102 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006), http://www.law.harvard.edul
faculty/dkennedy/publications/ruleoflaw.pdf [https:/perma.cc/Q7AS-QELH] (archived
Oct. 18, 2017).
120. For the stage-based development approach in China, see Michael J.
Sullivan, Developmentalism and China's Human Rights Policy, in DEBATING HUMAN
RIGHTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA 120 (Peter Van Nes ed.,
1999).
121. One such modernization theory was put forth by the American development
economist Walt Whitman Rostow in 1960. Rostow argued that economic growth
occurred through a set of linear stages. In each stage, certain government institutions
were thought to be necessary, while other government institutions were superfluous.
The development process began with a period of economic take-off, when the
urbanizing and industrializing economy started generating surplus, which could then
be used as investments into agriculture and industry. See W.W. ROSTow, THE STAGES
OF GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 4-16 (1960). For the model's influence on
Western development policy, see Tor Krever, The Legal Turn in Late Development
Theory: The Rule of Law and the World Bank's Development Model, 52 HARV. INT'L L. J.
287, 295 (2011).
122. See Kennedy, The 'Rule of Law," supra note 119, at 103 (discussing the use
of tariff schedules and other regulative measures in post-war development policy).
123. As Richard Posner notes, legal reform "is an important part of the
modernization process of poor countries, but the focus of such reform should be on
creating substantive and procedurally effective rules of contract and property rather
than on creating a first-class judiciary or an extensive system of civil liberties." Richard
A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK
RES. OBSERVER 1, 9 (1998).
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be counterproductive for the development process. On the one hand,
mature legal institutions, such as independent courts protecting
individual rights, may obstruct profitable business practices and
hinder the implementation of the government's economic policies.124
As a Chinese manager of an economic zone in Zambia told a
newspaper:
The standard of the [Zambian] legal system is a little too ahead of its time....
Almost 50 percent of the people are unemployed and yet they still want to have
so many housing allowances, education allowances and transportation
allowances. Also, employees can't be dismissed without good reason.1 2 5
On the other hand, constructing too "advanced" legal institutions
is seen as a drain on resources, which are needed for more important
uses, such as the construction of surplus-generating infrastructure
projects.12 6
Chinese declarations on development cooperation routinely refer
to the various "stages of development" in which its partner countries
find themselves. 127 The stage-based development model is also
apparent in Chinese descriptions of its domestic development
process.128 An IPRCC working paper outlining lessons "from China's
experience . . . for African countries," explains that the sequencing of
China's reforms "may hold lessons for [other countries]."129 According
to the working paper, China started with agricultural reforms, then
124. For the intellectual roots of this conception, see Kennedy, The 'Rule of
Law," supra note 119, at 103-04 (explaining that the post-war development consensus
viewed law as "legislation and the pronouncements of the legislature or executive,
rather than customary law, contract or property law and the pronouncement of judges"
and pointing out that law, including its rights protections, were "understood to place
few limits on development policy") (emphasis in original).
125. "You'll Be Fired if You Refuse": Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-




126. See id. (citing the above-mentioned Chinese manager, who contends that
"in the early stages of development ... equality gets sacrificed"); see also Donald C.
Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, AM. J.
COMP. L. 51 89, 110-11 (2003) (noting that the limited resources of a developing
country would be "better used in creating an effective structure for the prevention of
arbitrary confiscation . . . instead of for the creation of courts that could fairly
adjudicate contract disputes").
127. See, e.g., 2009 Beijing Declaration, supra note 98.
128. The White Paper on the Rule of Law, for instance, states that the Chinese
"legal framework shows certain characteristics of the current stage" of China's
development process. See The White Paper on the Rule of Law, Conclusion, supra note
101.
129. IPRCC, Development Partnerships for Growth and Poverty Reduction 2
(IPRCC Working Paper Series No. 7, 2010).
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moved on to labor-intensive manufacturing, and finally began to open
its economy progressively to foreign competition and investment.1 3 0
The implication of this development narrative for prominent
(moderately reformist) Chinese legal scholars is that China will adopt
increasingly advanced, Western-style legal institutions as it becomes
more "developed." However, adopting such institutions in the present
stage of China's development process would be harmful. 131 This
explanation neatly corresponds to Chinese justifications for its focus
on economic, social, and cultural rights at the expense of civil and
political rights. 132 At the same time, the stage-based narrative is
contrary to the view that civil and political rights, impartial courts,
and democratic processes are instrumentally necessary and
intrinsically valuable at every phase of the development process.13 3
C. Tolerance for Legally Ambiguous Practices as a Development
Strategy
Another reason for the marginal role of law in Chinese
development assistance relates to the Chinese government's tolerance
for legally ambiguous practices. Legally ambiguous practices are a
central element of Chinese development assistance projects. 134 In
addition to illegal conduct (such as violations of labor laws and
environmental regulations),1 35 Chinese development programs have
given rise to forms of informal economy that exist outside formal
government monitoring and taxation. For instance, Chinese
investments into sub-Saharan countries have coincided with the
rapid growth of the informal economic sector in these countries. The
informal economy consists of a large number of Chinese immigrants
(estimates of their number range from a few hundred thousand to
over a million), who run small-scale businesses serving Chinese
130. Id.
131. Li BUYUN, LUN RENQUAN [On Human Rights] 130 (2010); JI WEIDONG,
XIANZHENG XIN LUN: QUANQIUHUA SHIDAI DE FA YU SHEHUI BIANQIAN [New
Constitutional Theory: Legal and Social Change in an Era of Globalization: Second
Edition] 294 (2d ed., 2010); XIA YONG, Shizilukou hua fazhi [The Rule of Law at the
Crossroads] BIANYUAN SIXIANG 138, 142 (2008).
132. See Information Office of the State Council, White Paper on Human Rights
in China (1991), in THE CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 355, 361 (Stephen C. Angle &
Marina Svensson eds., 2001) (insisting on the primacy of the right to subsistence).
133. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 23-24 (2000); Amartya Sen, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 342-345, 379-
85 (2009); cf. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 7, at 14
(describing a country's transitioning to the rule of law as a "very long" process).
134. It should be borne in mind, however, that violations of local laws are not
unique to Chinese companies and conditions in Chinese companies are typically
comparable to the conditions in local businesses. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 299-301.
135. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 125.
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companies.13 6 These entrepreneurs are reportedly more accustomed
to the lack of legal clarity than Western investors. Indeed, the
unsettled legal environment of developing countries has been seen as
a pull factor for Chinese investments.13 7
The ability of Chinese entrepreneurs to operate in legally
ambiguous environments and the Chinese government's willingness
to tolerate such practices are not surprising given China's domestic
development experience. Much of China's development process has
occurred in spite of, rather than based on, legal regulations. For
instance, Donald Clarke has pointed out that the emergence of
limited liability companies in China in the early 1990s occurred
without a clear legislative basis.s3 8 Similarly, as China opened its
economy to international investors in the 1990s, its government
tolerated a large number of small-scale investors from Asian
countries, who were willing to operate in the outskirts of or beyond
formal law. Only after the Chinese government deemed these initial
investments successful was the legal framework put in place to
attract more conservative investors.1 39
Many consider Chinese tolerance for illegal and legally
ambiguous practices a hallmark of the entire Chinese development
model.140 Some Chinese development institutions acknowledge the
beneficial role of legally ambiguous practices in China's own
development process. For example, the so-called household
responsibility system replaced collective farming in the Chinese
countryside in the 1980s. Under this system, the Chinese government
assigned plots of land to individual households (rather than collective
farms) and allowed the households to keep all surplus food produced
on these plots. 141 The abovementioned IPRCC working paper on
development partnerships stresses that this model started as a
136. Raphael Kaplinsky, What Contribution Can China Make to Inclusive
Growth in Sub Saharan Africa?, 44 DEV. AND CHANGE 1295-316, 1310 (2013).
137. See Gu, supra note 65, at 577-78 (discussing Chinese entrepreneurs who
compare commercial opportunities in Nigeria to China in the 1980s and 1990s).
138. Companies purporting to have limited liability had simply been able to
secure a registration certificate to that effect from local authorities. In 1992, 480,000
such companies were established. The concept of limited liability (in contrast to a
limited liability company) did, however, exist in Chinese civil law at the time. Donald
C. Clarke, Judicial Innovation in Chinese Corporate Law, in LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN
ASIA: JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND THE INFLUENCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 259, 261-62
(John 0 Haley & Toshiko Takenaka eds., 2014).
139. See Shen, supra note 26, at 35 ("Instead of ... turning investors away,
China stepped up its efforts to reform its domestic economic system, gradually
improving its investment policy and legal framework to make it conducive to larger
[investors].").
140. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 301. This model (and the so-called "Beijing
Consensus") does not lead to the explicit negation of rights; rather, the question is
about the desired "balance of individual rights and responsibilities" and the relative
insignificance of rights in this balance. See RAMO, supra note 15, at 55.
141. PEERENBOOM, supra note 8, at 194-195.
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widespread "illegal practice."142 Relying on this example, the IPRCC
working paper makes the case for tolerating legally ambiguous
practices: "the most important implication here is that policies
accommodated the spontaneous actions on the ground."143 From this
perspective, formal law is not necessarily an instrument for social
change, as many Western development practitioners have
assumed,144 but a potential impediment to it.
IV. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF CHINESE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE
A. Advice on Law Reform
As mentioned above, the Chinese government and Chinese
development experts see more uses for legal development assistance
than previously. The most obvious example of Chinese legal
development assistance concerns support for law reform in developing
countries. Almost all donor states and multilateral organizations,
such as the World Bank, provide such assistance.145 Nowadays, the
Chinese government also recognizes the value of such assistance.146
In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese legal scholars
and practicing lawyers have urged interventions into developing
countries with regard to their domestic legislation on tax law,
company law, contract law, labor law, environmental law, and law
relating to land expropriation.1 4 7 Chinese assistance for law reform in
142. IPRCC, Development Partnerships, supra note 129, at 6.
143. Id. For the consequences of this approach for Chinese land titles, see Eva
Pils, Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and Social Unrest in China: A Case from
Sichuan 19 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 235 (2005).
144. For this assumption and its critique, see David M. Trubek, Back to the
Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 21 (1990).
145. See Newton, supra note 2, at 24, 37-38 (providing an overview of The World
Bank's legal assistance programs and the relative donation amounts in particular
nations, such as Kazakhstan in 1999).
146. FOCAC, THE SECOND FOCAC-LEGAL FORUM CONCLUDING REPORT (Oct.
29, 2010), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t765099.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cclD57Y-LGF9] (archived Oct. 17, 2017).
147. Zhang Yuejiao, 'Yidai yilu" zhanlie shishi de fall sikao [Legal
Considerations in the Implementation of the 'Belt and Road' Strategy], in "YIDAI YILU"
DE GUOJI FALU SHIYE: XIANGGANG 2015 "YIDAI YILU" GUOJI LUNTAN WENJI
[International Law Perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative: Collected Papers from
the 2015 Hong Kong International Forum on the "Belt and Road" Initiative] 12, 14
(Wang Guiguo ed., 2016); see also Zhu Xinli & Zhao Jun, 'Yidai yilu" zhanliie zhong de
guoji fali wenti [International Legal Aspects of the "Belt and Road" Strategy], in
"YIDAI YILU" DE GUOJI FALU SHIYE: XIANGGANG 2015 "YIDAI YILU" GUOJI LUNTAN WENJI
[International Law Perspective on the Belt and Road Initiative: Collected Papers from
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developing countries may seem self-serving (as does, of course,
Western rule of law aid), but it is easy to see why Chinese legal
institutions and standards-foreign investment laws and
environmental regulations, for instance-may appear more relevant
to the perceived needs of developing countries than Western laws.
The Chinese government has provided advice on law reform in
developing countries in a number of instances within and outside the
context of the Belt and Road Initiative,14 8 but these instances are
thinly documented in government reports and scholarship. Even
Chinese scholars researching development cooperation find it difficult
to access information on this kind of aid.14 9 But the 2014 White Paper
does mention a rare example of such assistance. According to the
white paper, a Chinese "expert eam dispatched to Benin provided
expertise to the drafting of the country's Agricultural Law and
Agricultural Administration Law."' 5 0 The white paper provides no
further information on this mission. Chinese databases containing
academic journals, magazines, and news reports are silent about
China's legal assistance to Benin, 151 and Chinese and foreign
development experts interviewed for this Article did not provide any
specific insights on it.
Nevertheless, the general nature of Chinese legal assistance to
Benin may be inferred from the circumstances of this assistance.
Chinese assistance for land law reform in Benin coincided with
Chinese investments into agricultural land in that country.152 Around
the time of the investments, the French language service of Xinhua-
the official Chinese news agency-expressed concerns about the
security of land titles in Benin, 153 which at the time recognized
customary land titles as having an.equal status vis-A-vis formal land
the 2015 Hong Kong International Forum on the "Belt and Road" Initiative] 318 (Wang
Guiguo ed., 2016).
148. Interview E, Beijing (Jun. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview L,
Beijing (Jun. 2017) (notes on file with author).
149. Interview L, supra note 148.
150. 2014 White Paper, supra note 27. For background on land rights reforms in
Benin, see Philippe Lavigne Delville, Competing Conceptions of Customary Land
Rights Registration (Rural Land Maps PFRs in Benin): Methodological, Policy and
Polity Issues (Les Cahiers du P61e Foncier No. 5, 2014).
151. As of November 18, 2016, a search for the Chinese language words "JQI"
(Benin) and "'O AkM " (Agricultural Law) in the comprehensive China National
Knowledge Infrastructure database produces 29 references. Besides a reference to the
2014 White Paper, supra note 27, none of these references discusses China's legal
assistance to Benin.
152. See DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, WILL AFRICA FEED CHINA? 125 (2015)
[hereinafter BRAUTIGAM AFRICA].
153. Binin: Des Lois Relatives au Code Foncier et Domanial et Code de
L'aminagement et de L'urbanisme en Gestations, XINHUA (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8062439.html [https://perma.cc/4GZP-NRMC]
(archived Oct. 19, 2017).
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titles.154 Benin subsequently adopted a new land code in 2013, which
aimed at securing land rights by formalizing the procedures for
obtaining land titles.1 55 The new law also allowed foreign investors to
enjoy up to fifty-year leaseholds to rural land.156 China likely offered
this legal assistance to Benin to secure these land titles for Chinese
and other foreign investors.1 57
In general, Chinese assistance for law reform is not
conceptualized as direct government-to-government assistance. For
instance, Chinese models have undoubtedly influenced Vietnamese
foreign investment laws,158 and Vietnamese scholars and officials
have studied Chinese laws in much detail. 5 9 However, assistance
from China to Vietnam-in contrast to Japanese legal assistance to
Vietnam 6 0-has not been framed as legal development assistance.
Vietnamese development officials visit Chinese government offices as
part of projects funded by donor states other than China.16 ' The ties
between the two countries are, however, formalizing and the Chinese
side is addressing legal issues in Vietnam in more explicit terms.
China and Vietnam agreed to cooperate in legal matters and
professional exchanges in 2016.162 In April 2017, a group of Chinese
154. See BRAUTIGAM, AFRICA, supra note 152, at 125 ("[I]n 2007 Benin's
National Assembly had passed a law granting customary land-tenure equal status with
civil law property rights ... ).
155. See Code Foncier et Domanial en R~publique du B~nin, adopted on January
14, 2013, https://visages-du-benin.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/DSL-LOI-
PORTANT-CODE-FONCIER-II.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRA5-9CF7] (archived Oct. 19,
2017).
156. See id. arts. 14 and 61.
157. It appears that China's lobbying was not entirely successful, since a
significant Chinese investor ultimately failed to secure the land rights it was seeking.
See HUA LIEN INT'L (HOLDING) Co. LTD., ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE PROVISION FOR
IMPAIRMENT LOSSES ON ETHANOL BIOFUEL BUSINESS IN BENIN AND PROFIT WARNING 2
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedcollistconews/SEHK/2014/0303/
LTN201403031856.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.ccl96SE-G9WH]
(archived Oct. 19, 2017); see also BRAUTIGAM AFRICA, supra note 152, at 125-26.
158. See generally John Gillespie, Juridification of State Regulation in Vietnam,
in LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM: A COMPARISON OF ASIAN COMMUNIST
REGIMES 92 (John Gillespie & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2010); Mark Sidel, Law Reform in
Vietnam: The Complex Transition from Socialism and Soviet Models in Legal
Scholarship and Training, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 221 (1993).
159. See Mark Sidel, The Re-Emergence of China Studies in Vietnam, 142 CHINA
Q. 521 (1995) (discussing the study of China in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam).
160. See Nicholson & Kuong, supra note 2, at 157-60 (describing Japanese legal
assistance to Vietnam as an "important moment for Japan, enabling it to move from
micro-level technical assistance in economic matters, to offering its experience as an
Asian model to another Asian state").
161. Email from Dr. Nguyen Dinh Cung, President of Central Institute for
Economic Management, Vietnam (Nov. 18, 2016) (on file with author).
162. See Vietnam, China Augment Law and Judicial Cooperation, VOICE OF
VIETNAM (Sept. 22, 2016), http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/164164/
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environmental experts visited Vietnam to discuss Vietnam's
environmental laws and to examine the need for further Chinese
assistance in this field, particularly in relation to Chinese companies'
operations in that country.1 6 3
A similar form of legal influence exists between China and
African countries with regard to foreign investment laws, in general,
and special economic zones (SEZs), in particular. SEZs played an
important role in the development of the domestic Chinese economy
after the Maoist era, allowing the Chinese government to experiment
with economic reforms and to attract foreign investors to
geographically confined areas. 164 As Chinese companies began
moving their operations out of China in the 2000s, the Chinese
government started supporting the establishment of overseas SEZs to
host Chinese companies abroad. 165 Chinese-supported SEZs have
been established in five African countries, 166 and some of these
countries reportedly modeled their SEZ laws on the Chinese
example.6 7
Finally, China has taken tentative steps to promote the
harmonization of the laws of its trading partners. With regard to
vietnam--china-augment-law-and-judicial-cooperation.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cc2G8L-TXNS] (archived Oct. 19, 2017) (explaining that during a
courtesy visit on September 22, 2016, Vietnam and China agreed to "boost their
affiliation in judicial assistance . . . through the full implementation of the reached
agreement on judicial assistance in civil and criminal matters, and exchange
professional experience").
163. CHINA-ASEAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION CENTER, DONGMENG
ZHONGXIN ZUTUAN FU YUENAN KAIZHAN HUANJING YINGXIANG PINGJIA HEZUO DIAOYAN
(Group from ASEAN Center visits Vietnam to investigate cooperation in environmental
impact assessment), http://www.chinaaseanenv.org/zhxx/zxyw/201705/t20170504-
413508.shtml (last visited Jun. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/FHH4-3SRM] (archived Jan.
10, 2018). For the policy framework facilitating this cooperation, see MINISTRY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF CHINA & ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES OF ASEAN
MEMBER STATES, ASEAN-CHINA STRATEGY ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 2016-
2020, http://environment.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ASEAN-China-
Strategy-on-Environmental-Cooperation-2016-2020.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/B92X-DGCZ] (archived Jan. 10, 2018).
164. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 96-97.
165. See generally id. at 100.
166. A UNDP report notes that the Chinese government has helped five African
countries to establish and manage SEZs under the auspices of FOCAC process.
Individual Chinese enterprises have set up SEZs in five other countries. See United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), If Africa Builds Nests, Will the Birds
Come? Comparative Study on Special Economic Zones in Africa and China 12-13
(UNDP, Working Paper No. 06, 2015).
167. This was the case at least with Egypt and Tanzania. See FOCAC, THE
SECOND FOCAC-LEGAL FORUM CONCLUDING REPORT (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t765099.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/56VY-TGGC] (archived Oct. 23, 2017). Chinese influence in Egypt
predates the Chinese globalization drive. See Deborah Brautigam & Xiaoyang Tang,
African Shenzhen: China's special economic zones in Africa, 49 J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD.
27, 38 (2011). Other countries besides China have offered legal aid relating to the
establishment of SEZs. Zambia adopted an SEZ law with the help of Japanese
development assistance. See UNDP, supra note 166, at 33-34.
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African law, such efforts have included conferences on legal
harmonization and Chinese translations of books on this topic.168 The
IPRCC has touted the benefits of legal harmonization for trade in the
Asia-Pacific region.16 9
B. Legal Capacity-Building Programs
1. Training Modalities in the Legal Sector
The most visible part of Chinese legal development assistance
consists of legal capacity-building programs. Such assistance is part
of a larger shift in Chinese foreign aid from material assistance and
infrastructure projects to human resources development, as described
in Part I.B above.'70 Capacity-building programs in the legal sector
are less extensive than programs in other fields and typically they are
framed as "cooperation" rather than as "aid."17' Publicly available
information indicates that hundreds of foreign lawyers, judges, and
government officials have attended legal training courses in China.17 2
China Law Society, a "government-operated non-governmental
organization," 173 offers law-specific training programs for foreign
lawyers and officials as part of its foreign cooperation. The training
programs include lectures and visits to government offices, courts,
law firms, and cultural sights.174 The courses are small-scale and
168. Mancuso, supra note 29, at 258 n.60.
169. IPRCC, Trade Facilitation and Poverty Reduction: The Case Study on
China-ASEAN Region 2 (Working Paper Series No. 12, 2012).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87; see also, Li Aoxue & Zhong Nan,
Training Power, CHINA DAILY (May 31, 2013), http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/
weekly/2013-05/31/content_16550646.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/38VQ-QF3T] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
171. See, e.g., China Law Society Introduction, CHINA LAW SOCIETY,
http://chinalawsociety.com/Templates/Template2.aspx?ColumnlD=998 (last visited
Feb. 17, 2017) (on file with author). Please note that the China Law Society website is
currently unserviceable. All references to the "China Law Society's website" in this
Article are to the unserviceable website. Also note that the Author has copies of each of
said references on file for continued access during this period of unserviceability.
172. For instance, China Law Society's website indicates that 200 legal
professionals from member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) have attended training courses in China and that 50 lawyers participated in
the first two China-Africa Legal Professionals Exchange Projects. See the information
under "Legal Forum" at http://www.chinalawsociety.com/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
(on file with author). For other training courses, see infra notes 175, 186-187.
173. See generally Chen Jie, The NGO Community in China: Expanding
Linkages with Transnational Civil Society and Their Democratic Implications, 68
CHINA PERSPECTIVES 29, 31 (2006).
174. Dr. Gu Zhaomin, Director General of Overseas Liaison Department, CHINA
LAw SOCIETY, Invitation to the Third Course of China-Africa Young Legal Professionals
Exchange Program (Mar. 11, 2016) (on file with author).
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offered for twenty to twenty-five participants from specific
geographical regions, such as Africa and Northeast Asia.1 5
In addition to these training courses, thousands of lawyers-both
from China and abroad-have participated in "Legal Forums," which
are essentially a series of regional conferences on legal issues.1 7 6
Chinese legal cooperation with African countries, for instance, takes
place under the auspices of the FOCAC Legal Forum.1 7 7 Similar legal
forums exist for several regions around the world.1 8 According to
figures posted by China Law Society on its website, in 2015 nearly a
thousand lawyers and government officials participated in six
regional legal forums.1 79
There is an ongoing effort to scale up and institutionalize
Chinese capacity-building programs in the legal sector. The first step
toward this was the establishment of the African Law Institute in
Xiangtan University in Hunan Province in 1998.180 The Institute
became a venue for conferences and for hosting visiting African legal
scholars, and it produced scholarship on African law. 181 Since then,
175. As of 2016, China Law Society has organized three annual courses for
African lawyers. Id. China Law Society has organized a similar course for lawyers from
Northeast Asia. See Northeast Asia Legal Professionals Exchange Project, CHINA LAW
SOCIETY, http://chinalawsociety.com/Templates/Template2.aspx?ColumnID=1065 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2017) (on file with author).
176. Information posted on China Law Society's website indicates that 5,220
Chinese and foreign lawyers participated in legal forums between 2005 and 2015. The
figures provided by China Law Society do not distinguish between Chinese and foreign
lawyers and they may be incomplete or inaccurate. Some of the lawyers may have
participated in several forums. These figures are available under the regional "Legal
Forum" tabs on China Law Society's website, http://chinalawsociety.com (last visited
Feb. 17, 2017) (on file with author).
177. See, e.g., FOCAC, THE FIRST "FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION-
LEGAL FORUM" (Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.focac.orgleng/dsjbzjhy/hxxd/t648400.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M377-EC5M] (archived Oct. 23, 2017);
FOCAC, supra note 167.
178. Legal forums exist for (i) ASEAN countries, (ii) Eurasian countries, (iii)
Latin American countries, (iv) Northeast Asian countries, (v) European countries, (vi)
BRICS countries (that is, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), (vii) South
Asian countries, (viii) Japan and South Korea, and (ix) Oceanian countries. China Law
Society, Introduction, supra note 171 (on file with author).
179. The actual figure probably exceeded a thousand lawyers, since the website
does not appear to provide information on all legal forums organized in 2015. The
information is provided under "Legal Forum" on the China Law Society website,
http://www.chinalawsociety.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (on file with author). As
said, the figures provided by China Law Society do not distinguish between Chinese
and foreign lawyers.
180. See Mancuso, supra note 29, at 255 (discussing research on African Legal
systems in Xiangtan University); Xia Xinhua & Xiao Haiying, On Sino-Africa
Relationship and Legal Cooperation, 12 U. BOTSWANA L. J. 173, 178 (2011); Interview
H, Beijing (Jun. 2016) (notes on file with author).
181. See Zhu Weidong, China-African Trade Investment and the Exchange of
Law, CHINA LAW INFO, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleFullText.aspx?Articleld=




China Law Society has helped set up a number of "Legal Training
Bases" for specific geographical regions to facilitate legal capacity-
building programs.1 82
The Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO), a
training institution within MOFCOM, is another significant training
provider for China's foreign development assistance programs. 183
According to the most recently available figures, AIBO gave 933
seminars and workshops to more than twenty thousand foreign
officials from 155 countries between 1998 and 2015.184 Again, little
information exists on AIBO's training activities.18 5 AIBO uploaded a
large number of project documents detailing its training programs on
182. So far, at least the following "Legal Training Bases" have been set up: (i) In
2012, the Law Society established the China-Africa Legal Training Base in Xiangtan
University. (ii) In 2014, China Law Society established another "Africa Training Base"
in the Beijing Foreign Studies University. (iii) Between 2013-2013 the Law Society
established a "North Asia Legal Training Base" at Jilin University in Changchun,
where it has offered training courses for officials, scholars, and lawyers from North
Korea, Mongolia, South Korea, Russia, and Malaysia (a country which is obviously not
in North Asia). (iv) In 2015, the Law Society set up another "Legal Training Base" for
Latin American lawyers at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, which
is tasked with "cultivating Latin American legal talents who are knowledgeable of
Chinese legal systems [sic] and friendly to China." This project is part of a five-year
program to provide 6,000 governmental scholarships and 6,000 training contracts for
Latin American and Caribbean countries in various fields. See Yang Lan, Regulated by
Law, GLOBAL TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015). (v) A "BRICS Legal Professionals Training Base"
has been established at the East China University of Political Science and Law, also
located in Shanghai. There are two training bases for ASEAN countries: (vi) "China-
ASEAN Legal Training Base" and (vii) "China-ASEAN Training Base for High-Level
Legal Talents." References to these training bases are available under the regional
"Legal Forum" tabs on China Law Society's website, http://chinalawsociety.com (last
visited Feb. 17, 2017) (on file with author). Legal Training Bases have also been
established for (viii) Eurasian lawyers at the Northwest University of Political Science
and Law in Xi'an, and (ix) for European lawyers at the China University of Political
Science and Law in Beijing. See Di si jie Zhongguo-Ya-Ou fala luntan zai Xi'an
zhaokai (The Fourth China-Eurasia Legal Forum Held in Xi'an), CHINA LAW SOCIETY
(Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.chinalaw.org.cn/Column/ColumnView.aspx?ColumnD=
734&InfoID=17028 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/94KE-WEW6]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017) (on file with author); Di si jie Zhongguo-Ouzhou faldi luntan
zai Jing zhaokai (The Fourth China-Europe Legal Forum Held in Beijing), CHINA
COURT (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/10/id/
2318045.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
183. See Li & Zhong, supra note 170 (referring to the AIBO president's
statement that "the academy has now become China's largest training center for
officials from developing countries, especially for those from Africa.").
184. The precise numbers are as follows: by the end of 2015, AIBO had received
22,143 officials including 584 ministerial-level officials. See AIBO, 2016 Seminar for
Judges from 10 Southeast Asian Countries, Sept. 8-21, 2016 (on file with author).
185. For a rare example, see KING, supra note 1, at 161.
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its website, but these were made unavailable during the writing of
this Article.186
The project documents describe AIBO's law-related training
activities in some detail. Some of the training courses organized by
AIBO are carried out directly by AIBO in its Beijing training facility,
whereas others are organized by AIBO but carried out by various
teaching institutions across China.18 7 Some training activities are of a
general nature, introducing foreign officials to the Chinese judicial
system. 188 Most training courses, however, cover specific topics in
Chinese law. AIBO has offered training courses on Chinese
intellectual property rights,189 anti-trust law,19 0 and taxation.19 1 Yet
other training courses focus on aspects of China's foreign trade,
exposing foreign officials to Chinese and international investment
regimes.192 The above-described Belt and Road Initiative has also
been the subject of a legal training program.193 AIBO has even
trained foreign officials in the practices and legal framework of
186. AIBO's website, china-aibo.cn, included information about dozens of
courses on legal topics and law enforcement, each of which was typically offered to 20-
25 people. Some of these documents, cited in this Article, are on file with the author.
187. For instance, as of April 2016, AIBO had sent foreign officials to the China
Maritime Police Academy to take part in fourteen seminars on "Law Enforcement at
Sea for Developing Countries," two seminars on "Law Enforcement at Sea for African
French Speaking Countries," and a workshop on "Boat Driving and Maintaining Skills
for Cooperation in Patrol and Law Enforcement along the Mekong River." See AIBO,
Seminar on Maritime Law Enforcement for Asian Countries in 2016 (Apr. 8-Apr. 28,
2016) (on file with author).
188. See AIBO, Seminar on Judicial System Construction for Developing
Countries (Jun. 14-Jun. 27, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that the seminar will
include 'lectures on practical subjects [including] visiting companies . . . and visiting
other provinces"); AIBO, 2016 Seminar for Judges from 10 Southeast Asian Countries
(Sept. 8-Sept. 21, 2016) (on file with author) (stating that the seminar covers topics
such as "General Review of China" and "Organization of the court system in China").
189. AIBO, Seminar on IPR for African English-Speaking Countries (Jun. 19-
Jul. 9, 2012) (on file with author); AIBO, Seminar on Intellectual Property Rights for
Developing Countries in 2016 (Jun. 27-Jul. 17, 2016) (on file with author).
190. For instance, in 2012 AIBO organized a seminar on Chinese anti-trust law
for twenty officials from African, Asian, and Eastern European countries. See AIBO,
Seminar on Anti-Trust Law (Apr. 15-Apr. 28, 2012) (on file with author). Two years
later the same seminar was offered to officials from Asian and Eastern European
countries. See AIBO, Seminar on Anti-Trust Law for Asian and European Countries in
2014 (Mar. 20-Apr. 9, 2014) (on file with author).
191. AIBO, 2013 Seminar on Tax Officials for Developing Countries (Oct. 17-
Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with author).
192. AIBO, 2016 Seminar on Trade Facilitation for Greater Mekong Subregion
Countries (Jul. 13-Aug. 2, 2016) (on file with author).
193. In 2016, AIBO organized a "Seminar for Legal Personnel of Countries in
Belt and Road Areas," introducing 20 officials to topics such as "the Socialist Rule of
Law System with Chinese Characteristics," "China's Judicial Reforms" and "Special
Policy and Legal Practice of China's Special Economic Zone and Free Trade Zone." See
AIBO, 2016 Seminar for Legal Personnel of Countries in Belt and Road Areas (Oct. 13-
Nov. 2, 2016) (on file with author).
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Chinese foreign development aid. 194 AIBO also facilitates law
enforcement training on policing and counter-terrorism. Some
training courses are tailored for tackling law enforcement issues in
specific countries. For instance, AIBO has facilitated a seminar for
law enforcement officials in the Mekong River region.i9 5 In 2016,
AIBO supported a training course on counter-terrorism in Kenya.196
In addition to China Law Society and AIBO, many other training
providers exist in China. For instance, the Law Faculty of Peking
University has offered seminars and training courses for African
officials since 2001. 197 The Chinese government also offers
scholarships to English-taught degree programs in Wuhan
University's Master of International Law and Chinese Law
Programme. 198
2. Substance and Intended Effects of Training Courses
While the four-week training courses facilitated by AIBO on
specific fields of Chinese law probably cover some amount of technical
detail,1 99 the training courses organized by the China Law Society are
better described as cultural diplomacy and exchange rather than as
technical training in substantive areas of law.2 00 The organizers of
194. AIBO, 2015 Seminar on Foreign Aid Agency for Developing Countries (Oct.
14-Nov. 10, 2015) (on file with author).
195. AIBO, Seminar on Law Enforcement for Laos, Myanmar, Thailand in 2014
(Jun. 10-30, 2014) (on file with author).
196. The training, carried out by the Shandong Police College, covered topics,
such as the Chinese judicial system, Chinese martial arts, and the use of information
technology in Chinese policing. See AIBO, 2016 Seminar for Senior and Middle-rank
Police Officers of African Countries (May 10-30, 2016) (on file with author).
197. KING, supra note 1, at 49.
198. AIBO, List of MOFCOMDegree Education Programs (Apr. 25, 2016) (on file
with author).
199. See supra notes 189-195. Most of the materials relating to the training
courses-handouts, syllabuses, and slides-are not publicly available and could not be
obtained from the course facilitators for this Article. However, some information about
the courses is available on the Internet. News releases and reports, internet postings,
publicly shared invitations to China Law Society's training courses, and the formerly
available AIBO project documents outline the broad content of these training courses.
For a news release, see, FOCAC, FIRST AFRIcAN LEGAL TRAINING PROGRAMME OPENED
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/tll91050.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2017) [https://perma.cc/856B-QP22 (archived Jan. 10, 2018); for a news report, see Li
& Zhong, supra note 170; for an invitation, see Gu, supra note 174. As mentioned, this
Article also benefits from course materials obtained from foreign participants in two
training courses organized by China Law Society. See supra note 32.
200. This goal is made explicit in a news release about the First African Legal
Training Programme. See FOCAC, supra note 199. The diplomatic goals distinguish
Chinese legal training programs from the more technical Japanese training programs.
See Nicholson & Kuong, supra note 2, at 175. AIBO training courses seem to cover
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China Law Society's training courses seem to make an effort to
portray the Chinese legal system in the best possible light to foreign
participants. Some of the lecturers obtained to speak in these courses
are prominent, politically moderate Chinese legal scholars from elite
Chinese universities. Such high-level scholars have included
Professor Zhang Wenxian, an early promoter of individual rights in
China, and Professor Wang Liming, the Vice President of the elite
Renmin University in Beijing, who has been an important participant
in Chinese civil law reforms.20 1 Both scholars can be relied upon to
deliver an optimistic and politically correct progress story about the
development of socialist rule of law in contemporary China.202 Some
lecturers have politically conservative profiles, 203 while other
instructors seem to have been chosen for their expertise on specific
legislation.204
The abovementioned training courses organized by the China
Law Society aim to present an overall picture on Chinese law and
society. In a four-week course offered to African lawyers in 2014,
Professor Zhang Wenxian lectured on "[t]he Construction of Legal
System and the Development of Rule of Law in China," and Professor
Wang Liming gave a lecture entitled "General Introduction to
Chinese Civil Law and Chinese Property Law."2 05 Other topics in the
course concerned human rights and the Chinese constitution, the
handling of foreign-related matters, Chinese financial law, company
law, and law on foreign investments.206 Legal issues relating to the
Chinese labor system were also discussed.20 7 A participant reported
that the absence of freely organized labor unions, which is a sensitive
more specific ground than the trainings organized by China Law Society. See supra
notes 189-195.
201. Program for the First CALPEC Course (China-Africa Legal Professionals
Exchange Project), CHINA LAW SOCIETY (Sept. 1-30, 2014) (on file with author)
[hereinafter CALPEC Course].
202. Professor Wang Liming has participated in Chinese law reform as a
member of the National People's Congress. See He Qinhua et al., 60 Leading Figures of
Law in China over Past 60 years, CHINA L. 62, 63 (2009). Professor Zhang Wenxian has
served as Vice-President of Jilin University and as a representative of the CCP in Jilin
Provincial Higher People's Court. Id. at 76. For a representative work by Zhang
Wenxian, see ZHANG WENXIAN, FAZHEXUE FANCHOU YANJIU (Categories of Legal
Philosophy) (2001). For a representative work by Wang Liming, see WANG LIMING, WO
GuO MINFADIAN ZHONGDA YINAN WENTI ZHI YANJIU (Major Problems in China's Civil
Code) (2006). I have discussed Professor Wang's and Zhang's scholarship and
ideological projects in SEPPANEN, supra note 8, at 37-38, 110-13.
203. This is true of Professor Mo Jihong, a researcher with the China Academy
of Social Science, who lectured on human rights in a course offered for African lawyers.
See CALPEC Course, supra note 201. For Professor Mo's political views, see David
Bandurski, The 'Black Hands" of Occupy Central, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT,
http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/10/10/36410/ [https://perma.cc/764B-LC6L] (archived Nov. 7,
2017).
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topic in China, was explicitly addressed in this context.208 The time
allotted for each topic-about three hours-did not allow but for a
general discussion of key legal concepts and policies in each field. A
lecture on Chinese foreign investment law in a course offered to
African lawyers in 2016, for instance, provided a formalistic overview
of the permitted types of foreign investment vehicles and the sectors
of investment that are open to foreigners in China.20 9
These lectures seem to portray the Chinese legal system as one
that is steadily improving. As one African participant in a training
course organized by the China Law Society reports:
China is now embracing the concept of Rule of Law with Chinese
characteristics. In the 18th Congress of the National People's Congress (NPC),
President Xi Jing Pin further confirmed the Party's intention to promote the
rule of law in China.
2 10
Such statements are in line with the stage-based narrative on legal
development advanced by mainstream Chinese legal scholars. In
contrast to the politically conservative voices in the Chinese legal
academia, 211 the mainstream view does not vilify Western-style
liberal legal institutions. Instead, Chinese mainstream legal scholars
conceptualize China's development as the process of catching up with
Western models, while still stressing the uniqueness of the Chinese
development experience.212 As an optimistic progress narrative, this
view ignores important trends in contemporary China. In the past
few years, the state has reversed the course of legal reforms, for
instance, detaining a number of rights advocates and activist
lawyers.213
Anecdotally, it seems that the instructors in legal training
courses-who are, of course, a trusted group of scholars-have
208. Telephone interview with a course participant (Nov. 2, 2016) (notes on file
with author). For Chinese labor unions, see Anita Chan, China's Trade Unions in
Corporatist Transition, in ASSOCIATIONS AND THE CHINESE STATE: CONTESTED SPACES
69 (Jonathan Unger ed., 2008).
209. Handouts from the Third China-Africa Legal Professionals Exchange
Project (May 29-Jun. 11, 2016) (on file with author).
210. Kate Li Kwong Wing, The China-Africa Legal Professionals Exchange
Project, 2 CHINESE BUS. CHAMBER MAURITIUS NEWSL. 11 (2015).
211. See, e.g., SHIGONG JIANG, FAZHI YU ZHILI: GUOJIA ZHUANXINGZHONG DE
FALU (Legal System and Governance: Law in a Transforming State) 9 (2003).
212. See, e.g., Xia Yong, Shizilukou Hua Fazhi (The Rule of Law at the
Crossroads), BIANYUAN SIXIANG 138, 142 (2008).
213. See generally Carl F. Minzner, China's Turn against Law, 59 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 935 (2011); EVA PILS, CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE
(2015).
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considerable discretion in deciding how to teach these subjects.214 An
instructor of AIBO courses interviewed for this Article noted that the
instructors are broadly aware of topics that should be avoided in
AIBO courses-human rights, labor unions, and social inequality-
but that they may, nonetheless, raise these issues, for instance, by
asking course participants to contemplate the social costs of China's
development process.215 Other instructors feel able to discuss these
issues at least in the courses organized by the China Law Society.216
Sometimes instructors deliver diametrically opposed messages: one
instructor may seek to justify certain social costs of development
projects on the basis of their economic benefits, whereas another
instructor may object to the same costs.2 17 This picture conforms to
what is known of Chinese legal capacity-building programs in other
fields of development cooperation. As regards agricultural training
courses, for instance, there is "no evidence of an overbearing,
centrally directed 'Beijing Consensus' being peddled through the
courses." 218 Instead, capacity-building programs in this field are
diverse, "muddled and disorganized."219
At least some of the training courses are not constructed solely to
disseminate information about the Chinese legal system to foreign
lawyers; they also seek to facilitate a dialogue between the Chinese
hosts and foreign lawyers. African participants in training courses
organized by the China Law Society receive lists of topics that are of
interest to the Chinese course organizers. These topics have included
the role of law in economic globalization, the protection of traditional
knowledge in African law, and the role of customary law in African
legal systems.220 The topics are discussed in class, and significant
time is allotted to discussions between the lecturers and the course
participants.22 1
While the overall aim of the training courses does not seem to be
the promotion of a distinctly Chinese view on the role of law in social
214. Interview D, Beijing (Jun. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview F,
Beijing (Jun. 2016) (notes on file with author); Interview I, Hong Kong (Jul. 2016)
(notes on file with author). A MOFCOM manual on foreign aid training requires that
the content of the training courses be in line with Chinese foreign policy objectives and
"embody the fruits of China's economic development." MOFCOM, SHANGWUBU DUIWAI
YUANZIHU PEIXUN XIANGMU SHISHY GUANLI GONGZUO SHOUCE (2010 NIAN 8 YUE XIUDING
BAN) (MOFCOM Manual for the Management of Foreign Aid Training, as Revised in
Aug. 2010) art. 60 (on file with author).
215. Interview K, Beijing (Jun. 2017) (notes on file with author).
216. See supra text accompanying note 208.
217. Interview D, supra note 214.
218. Henry Tugendhat & Dawit Alemu, Chinese Agricultural Training Courses
for African Officials: Between Power and Partnerships, 81 WORLD DEV. 71, 79 (2016).
219. Id.
220. CALPEC Course, supra note 201.
221. Telephone interview, supra note 208. In a four-week course offered to
African lawyers, three afternoons were reserved for discussion with Chinese lecturers
and the course participants. See CALPEC Course, supra note 201.
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and economic development, instructors sometimes discuss
development models in explicitly normative terms. For instance, a
course offered to African lawyers in 2016 included a lecture on the
political aspects of Chinese investments in Africa. The instructor was
highly critical of American "value-based diplomacy" in Africa and the
American agenda of democracy promotion. According to the slides
shown by the instructor, the American "claims of 'democracy' and
'liberty' [were] nothing but grant [sic] statements and gestures."222 In
the speaker's view, Africans ought to look for "benefits in real terms:
investment, economic and trade cooperation."223 Echoing a statement
in the People's Daily,224 the instructor's slides lamented the fact that
a "tickle" of criticism about the Chinese neocolonialism and
exploitation of natural resources in Africa had "struck a chord of
dissonance" with African governments.225 The participants were told
that such views were "biased and ill-grounded."226
With the available information, it is impossible to know whether
the training courses achieve their stated goals, which ultimately come
down to increasing "friendship and cooperation."2 2 7 At the outset, it
appears that some short-term training courses fail to reach
influential foreigners or turn course participants into experts on
Chinese law. Still, at least some participants in these training
courses are very satisfied with their experience,228 and the course
evaluations are positive.229 It helps that the courses are free.230 In
addition to a pleasant stay in China, the training courses provide an
opportunity for lawyers from developing countries to tap into the
potentially lucrative field of international business. For some course
participants, the courses offer their first chance to come in touch with
222. Handouts from the Third China-Africa Project, supra note 209.
223. Id.
224. "New Colonialism" Targeting China-Africa Cooperation Untenable,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (Jul 18, 2012), http://en.people.cn/90883/7880245.html
[https://perma.cclJ8KX-J54H] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
225. Handouts from the Third China-Africa Project, supra note 209.
226. Id.
227. JOHANNESBURG ACTION PLAN, supra note 85.
228. Email from a course participant (Oct. 27, 2016) (on file with author); Email
from a course participant (Oct. 28, 2016) (on file with author); Email from a course
participant (Oct. 31, 2016) (on file with author). This anecdotal evidence conforms to
Kenneth King's survey of 200 Kenyan professionals, who took part in (non-legal) short-
term training courses in China. According to King, the short-term training courses
were overwhelmingly positive experiences for the participants, who were shown "some
of the best that China can offer, whether in roads, railways, rice cultivation or rural
development." KING, supra note 1, at 189. For a similar observation, see also
Tugendhat & Alemu, supra note 218, at 79.
229. Interview K, supra note 214.
230. China Law Society covers all the expenses of the training courses in China,
except for international travel expenses. Gu, supra note 173.
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international commerce and the legal infrastructure that supports
it. 231 Anecdotally, the training courses also seem to be able to
influence participants' views about the legitimacy of Chinese
development policies.2 32
C. Regulatory Compliance Support
Finally, a form of legal development assistance offered by the
Chinese government is directed toward Chinese companies operating
in developing countries. This form of assistance aims to ensure that
Chinese companies comply with regulations in their host countries.
As mentioned above in Part II.C, the tacit endorsement of illegal or
legally ambivalent conduct is seen to be a constituent element of the
Chinese development process.2 33 At the same time, some Chinese
government entities regard violations of law as a problem worth
addressing. According to an IPRCC report on corporate social
responsibility, Chinese companies operating in developing countries
"face criticism for their lack of proper regulations on ensuring human
value and employees' rights and environment protection." 234 The
IPRCC report explains that Chinese companies' "overseas behaviour
[is] the extension of domestic behaviour," and that the "[1]ack of legal
restriction and moral guidance" in China has contributed to the
illegal actions of Chinese companies abroad.2 35
The Chinese government and entities controlled by it (including
the China Banking Association, Exlm Bank, and Shanghai Stock
Exchange) have issued guidelines on the corporate social
responsibility of Chinese multinational companies, which stress the
importance of complying with local laws and regulations. 236
Unsurprisingly, Chinese multinational companies do not comply with
the guidelines calling for better regulatory compliance. 237
Nevertheless, there is some evidence of efforts by the Chinese
government to guide Chinese multinational enterprises to contribute
more to the host countries-among other places, Sudan, Kazakhstan,
231. Email from a course participant (Oct. 28, 2016), supra note 227.
232. A participant in a course organized by the China Law Society recalled
becoming more knowledgeable about the limits that labor rights and other human
rights protections place on a country's economic development. Telephone interview,
supra note 208.
233. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 301; RAMO, supra note 15, at 55.
234. IPRCC, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 103, at 6.
235. Id. at 15-16.
236. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CHINESE
OUTWARD INVESTMENT: EMERGING POLICY FRAMEWORK: A COMPILATION OF PRIMARY
SOURCES 10, 48, 178, 182 (2013).
237. As Deborah Brautigam notes, the guidelines provide no sanctions for failing
to implement their provisions, and Chinese companies have continued to be implicated
in illegal conduct. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at 301.
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and Brazil.238 Such guidance is, again, poorly documented, but some
written sources on this issue do exist.239 For instance, Chinese foreign
ministry officials have cited instances in which Chinese embassies
have intervened in the illegal practices of Chinese companies. 240
There are also some instances of Chinese multinationals attempting
to improve the social effects of their operations with the help of
international consulting firms.241
D. Chinese Legal Development Assistance in Comparison
As mentioned above, there are no official statistics on Chinese
legal development assistance, whereas the OECD provides
information on its members' spending on legal and judicial
development projects. 242 Based on the OECD data, it is safe to
conclude that Chinese legal development assistance is modest in
comparison to the rule of law aid provided by large Western donor
states and international development organizations. In 2015, the
United States spent USD 1.4 billion on 454 projects in legal and
judicial development.2 43 In the same year, the United Kingdom spent
USD 80 million on 263 legal and judicial development projects around
the world.24 4 Japan spent USD 156 million on legal development
assistance, Germany spent USD 136 million, and Denmark-which
donates about the same amount of concessional development aid as
China-spent USD 38 million on this sector.245 (On the other hand,
Russia reported no projects in legal and judicial development to the
238. IPRCC, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 103, at 12.
239. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
CHINESE BUSINESSES IN AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE ROLE OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 18 (Xiaoxue Weng & Lila Buckley
eds., 2016) (documenting informal governance oversight exercised by Chinese
embassies).
240. See CHATMAN HOUSE, CHINA'S PRIORITIES IN AFRICA: ENHANCING
ENGAGEMENTS 5 (2014) (detailing the efforts of Chinese embassies in handling issues
abroad where companies hide illegal activity); Interview H, supra note 180.
241. The ExIm Bank, for instance, has used the Finnish consulting firm P6yry
for conducting environmental assessments of its projects. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 1, at
303.
242. OECD DAC provides detailed statistics on ODA flows to legal and judicial
development. See OECD Statistics, supra note 1.
243. In China, these activities included USD 2.6 million for a project to "to
create a more favorable environment for national administrative and criminal
procedure law reform." The United States also supported training on intellectual
property enforcement in China to the tune of USD 130,000. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. Nicholson and Kuong estimate that between 2005 and 2011, Japan
donated approximately USD 80.6 million on legal development assistance. Nicholson &
Kuong, supra note 2, at 172.
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OECD. 24 6) International development agencies also spend substantial
amounts on rule of law projects. As of January 2017, the World Bank
listed fifty-three active projects and nearly eight hundred completed
projects on supporting the rule of law and the Bank's active
commitments on rule of law aid amounted to over USD 500 million. 2 47
Small-scale as it may be, Chinese legal development assistance is
not insignificant. As demonstrated above, Chinese government
entities have been particularly active in establishing and
institutionalizing legal capacity-building programs. Together with the
costs of running the legal training bases, organizing annual legal
forums for hundreds of lawyers, and arranging the occasional mission
to assist law drafting in developing countries, China's spending on
legal development assistance is probably comparable to the rule of
law aid of small European donors, such as Belgium and Finland.248
The early stages of the law and development movement in the
United States offer an interesting point of comparison to Chinese
legal development assistance. The first projects focusing explicitly on
legal and judicial development were initiated in the United States in
the 1960s. In both contemporary China and the United States in the
1960s, legal development assistance started as small-scale research
projects and scholarly exchanges, 249 as well as training courses
offered to select groups of lawyers in developing countries.250 Much
like the Chinese efforts in law and development in the late 1990s and
2000s,251 the first USAID grants on law and development were given
to American universities and centers studying law and
development.25 2
In terms of its substance, however, Chinese legal development
assistance differs from American legal development assistance in the
1960s and 1970s (let alone from more recent USAID rule of law
programs). Whereas the American law and development movement in
the 1960s was intent on spreading a form of pragmatic legal thought,
which was marked by the use of empirical knowledge to solve social
246. OECD Statistics, supra note 1.
247. WORLD BANK, PROJECTS AND OPERATIONS, http://projects.worldbank.org/
search?lang--en&searchTerm=&mjthemecode-exact=3 (last visited Jan. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc9ZM7-LHRC] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
248. According to OECD statistics, Belgium spent USD 4.3 million on four legal
and judicial projects in 2015. In the same year, Finland had 20 projects in legal and
judicial development totaling USD 4,0 million. OECD Statistics, supra note 1.
249. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On
the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM.
J. COMP. L. 457, 457 (1977).
250. Brian E. Butler, Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act: Foreign Aid and
Political Development, 3 L. & Soc'Y REV. 115, 121 n.20 (1968).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 180-181.
252. David M. Trubek, Law and Development: Forty Years after 'Scholars in
Self-Estrangement,' 66 U. TORONTO L. J. 301, 308 (2016).
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problems and skepticism about doctrinal law,2 53 Chinese development
experts are rhetorically, and also in practice, hesitant about
promoting a "Chinese model" of law and development.254
V. AN IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE?
Legal development assistance to foreign countries may not be
particularly high on the Chinese government's agenda, but even the
limited engagement of the Chinese government with such assistance
challenges our current understanding about the global flows of legal
knowledge. Legal knowledge (however distorted and partial) now
flows from East to South, which is an important phenomenon in its
own right. 255 A different question is whether Chinese legal
development assistance also poses a challenge to the policies and
ideological predilections promoted through Western rule of law aid.
This Part demonstrates that China's idiosyncratic governance
ideology and its foreign policy principles, as well as its role as a
capital-exporting country, have created a distinctive bundle of
tensions in Chinese legal development assistance, which further
erodes its policy coherence.
A. Commonsense Assumptions, Commercial Interests, and Strategic
Objectives
At the outset it must be emphasized again that the Chinese
government does not seek to challenge concepts such as the "rule of
law" or "human rights" on an explicitly ideological level.256 While the
253. See Trubek, Back to the Future, supra note 144, at 27.
254. See text accompanying supra note 218. Professor Lu Nan at Tsinghua
University identifies three areas of similarity and four areas of difference between
American legal development assistance since the 1960s till today and China's Belt and
Road Initiative. In terms of the similarities, (i) both strategies are undertaken by
economically powerful countries; (ii) both strategies include a legal element; and (iii)
both strategies have given rise to fierce interest conflicts and conceptual battles. In
terms of the differences, (i) the international status of the U.S. as a superpower and
China are different; (ii) the U.S., in contrast to China, possesses a mature legal system;
(iii) the U.S. targeted first nearby countries, making cultural differences less
problematic for American legal development assistance, whereas China's Belt and
Road Initiative comprises countries from Asia and Europe to Africa; and (iv) the U.S.
was informed by centuries of colonial experience, whereas China has no such colonial
tradition and is ethically opposed to colonialism. See Lu Nan, supra note 6, at 31-33.
255. As Teemu Ruskola points out, "the direction of cross-cultural legal
exchanges has been disproportionally from West to East." TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL
ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MODERN LAW 234-35 (2013).
256. Andrew J. Nathan, China's Challenge, 26 J. OF DEMOCRACY 156, 157-58
(2015).
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Chinese leadership now describes "the culture of socialism with
Chinese characteristics" as "a new option for other countries," this
option is advanced in vague and ideologically non-confrontational
terms as a means to address the demands of "democracy, rule of law,
fairness and justice."257 China's resistance to transnational (Western)
human rights and rule-of-law standards, as described in Part II.A
above, helps explain China's ideologically neutral posture. However,
the Chinese government's unwillingness to challenge the West
ideologically is also due to the ideological predispositions of the
Chinese political elite.
On a high level of abstraction, international development
organizations, Western donor states, and the Chinese government are
in agreement about the general ends of rule of law aid, even as
regards the intrinsically valuable relationship between the rule of law
and "democracy."258 International development agencies and Western
donor states typically rationalize rule of law aid through the
assumption that the rule of law is both instrumentally useful for
fostering economic growth and intrinsically valuable for democratic
and social development.2 5 9
257. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, upra note 10.
258. Democracy need not be synonymous with liberal multiparty democracy. For
a statement about China's "democratic" development, see CCP, Communiqu6 of the 4th
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Oct.
23, 2014), http://www.china.org.cn/china/fourth-plenary-session/2014- 12/02/content_
34208801.htm [https://perma.cc/6P4Y-4MG9] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
259. Different development agencies emphasize different aspects of this basic
assumption. The explanation given by the World Bank in its seminal 2002 World
Development Report, for instance, emphasizes the instrumentally useful positive
relationships between economic growth and the rule of law. In this report, the World
Bank defines the "rule of law" as "the collective importance of property rights, respect
for legal institutions, and the judiciary." WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 9 (2002). The World Development Report
from 2017, entitled Governance and the Law, highlights the intrinsic value of the rule
of law. The report asserts that the "rule of law ... is the very basis of good governance
needed to realize full social and economic potential" of a country. WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 7, at 83. The UNDP emphasizes the intrinsic
value of the rule of law (without losing sight of its instrumental uses). UNDP, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 20 (2010). USAID balances both the instrumental and intrinsic
rationales of rule of law aid. U.S. AGENCY INVL DEV., USAID STRATEGY ON DEMOCRACY
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE 16 (2013), https://www.usaid.gov/democracy-human-
rights-and-governance-strategy (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/S7QD-
APGX] (archived Oct. 21, 2017). Similarly, the British Department for International
Development (DFID) argues that there are both intrinsic and instrumental
relationships between poverty and the rule of law. DFID defines the rule of law as "a
system of predictable laws that govern people's behavior," which advances values that
are considered desirable in "a fair, open and democratic society." DFID, POLICY
APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW 7 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-
policy-approach-to-rule-of-law (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/2QSK-
94UA] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
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The Chinese government has no principled objection against this
assumption. As the Chinese government's White Paper on the Rule of
Law states, "legal construction serve[s] economic and social
development as well as the construction of a harmonious society."260
Such statements are half-truths since they ignore the considerable
efforts undertaken by Communist Party cadres to repress legal
institutions and individual rights holders. 261 Nevertheless, these
statements reflect one aspect of the paradoxical governance mentality
of the Chinese leadership. As far as it is possible to tell, contemporary
Chinese leaders see themselves not only as inheritors and guardians
of the people's democratic dictatorship, but also as technocrats
responding to the "objective needs of economic and social
development"-a phrase that is used to explain the need for legal
reforms in the White Paper on the Rule of Law.2 62 The Communist
Party refers to the concept of the "rule of law" as an ideal, which is
part of the "Chinese Dream,"263 and which is promoted as a "core
socialist value" on billboards all over China.264
On such a high level of abstraction, differences between various
rule-of-law models do not come into play in Chinese legal
development assistance. In contrast to Singapore, the Chinese
government does not publically advocate an instrumentalist, "thin"
version of the rule of law, which would be devoid of substantive
rights. 265 To be sure, in domestic debates conservative Chinese
political leaders have warned liberal-minded lawyers and scholars
against "publicly proclaiming Western constitutional democracy."266
Domestically, the Chinese government has also advocated a
specifically "socialist" rule of law ideal, which is defined as (i) ruling
the country according to law, (ii) implementing law for the people, (iii)
promoting fairness and justice, (iv) serving the overall situation, and
(v) following the party's leadership.267 In the international arena,
260. The White Paper on the Rule of Law, Conclusion, supra note 101.
261. See infra text accompanying notes 320-322.
262. The White Paper on the Rule of Law, supra note 101. For the technocratic
mentality of Chinese leadership, see LI CHENG, CHINA'S LEADERS: THE NEW
GENERATION 26-28 (2001).
263. Communiqu6 of the 4th Plenary Session, supra note 258.
264. Elizabeth J. Perry, The Populist Dream of Chinese Democracy, 74 THE J. OF
ASIAN STUD. 903, 905 (2015).
265. For the difference between China's and Singapore's position, see Sixth
Comm., U.N. Doc. GA/L/3326 (Oct. 25, 2007).
266. Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation: How Much is a Hardline Party
Directive Shaping China's Current Political Climate?, CHINAFLE (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation (last visited Feb. 17, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/6SV3-EHJN] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
267. CENTRAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY, SHEHUI ZHUYI FAZHI LINIAN DUBEN (THE SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW PRINCIPLE-A
READER) 4 (2009).
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however, the Chinese government does not promote a distinctively
socialist or instrumentalist approach to the rule of law. Instead, it
merely expresses concerns about the unilateral imposition of Western
standards on developing countries.268 As long as no such standards
are involved, the Chinese government can easily issue statements
that encourage developing countries "to improve democracy and the
rule of law."269
Moreover, the ever softening and relativizing conceptions of the
"rule of law" among international development experts have reduced
the need for Chinese development experts to formulate indigenous
Chinese conceptions of law and development. The World Bank's 2017
World Development Report describes "the rule of law" as a difficult to
reach "ideal," which eventually "emerges from a home-grown
(endogenous) process of contestation."270 Instead of a universalist rule
of law ideal, the World Bank's focus is now on the "role" of law in
development in specific contexts. The Bank argues that "a fully
modern legal system is not a precondition for rapid economic
growth,"271 and that legal reforms need to be informed by localized
and "[p]ragmatic policy design."272 The Bank also recognizes that
formal legal reforms may have negative consequences for ordinary
people.273 Pragmatism, the view of legal development as a stage-
based process, the quest for local solutions, and the skepticism
towards the omnipotent power of law are all part of the Chinese
government's playbook on development policy.274 Unsurprisingly, the
World Bank's report was drafted in conjunction with Chinese scholars
and officials.27 5
There are also readily understandable commercial motives
behind Chinese (and Western) legal development assistance, which
further reduce the urgency of the Chinese government to challenge
268. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (describing how China does not
desire to impose its own political standards on other countries).
269. Wen: China Pursues No Selfish Interest in Africa, XINHUA (Jun. 22, 2006),
http://wwwl.china.org.cnlenglishlfeatures/wenjiabaoafrica/172286.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4KP9-6AEJ] (archived Oct. 21, 2017). In this respect,
the Chinese position is analogous to the World Bank's description of the rule of law as
a difficult to reach "ideal," which "emerges from a home-grown (endogenous) process of
contestation." WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 7, at 14.
270. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 7, at 14.
271. Id. at 97.
272. Id. at 14-15.
273. The 2017 World Development Report explains how the passing of a
"contract law" in a developing country may make matters worse for ordinary people
when "the executive head of government [promises] to promote judges who favor some
people in court cases . . . and, as a result, citizens might not trust the courts to . ..
enforce contract law." Id. at 71.
274. IPRCC, Development Partnerships, upra note 129, at 2, 6.
275. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 7, at xvi.
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Western rule of law aid on ideological grounds.2 76 Rule of law rhetoric
offers a means for the Chinese government to remind developing
countries about their need to "protect the personal and property
rights of the Chinese investors, [and] respect the rule of law."27 7
China has aimed at creating "an enabling legal and business
environment" in African countries since the beginning of the 2000s.2 7 8
Capacity-building programs-legal forums, seminars, and training
courses-provide a concrete means to advocate favorable legal
changes in developing countries. 279 Such commercial motives
probably explain why China invited delegates from forty African
countries to Beijing in 2010 to discuss 'legal issues and resolution
measures concerning the investment liberalization and facilitation
between China and African countries."2 80
Chinese efforts to advise developing countries about Chinese
environmental standards may be motivated by similar commercial
interests. It is presumably in the interest of Chinese companies that
these standards be clear and predictable and sufficiently modest.281 A
major investor in developing countries, China is also concerned about
the security of its investments abroad (as are, of course, Western
governments). A concrete aim of Chinese legal capacity-building
programs has been the establishment of a Sino-African dispute
resolution mechanism, which is intended to replace European
arbitration centers as a site for dispute resolution between Chinese
and African companies.2 82 A policy paper outlining such a dispute
settlement mechanism was circulated to the participants in the first
FOCAC training course for African lawyers.283
276. For commercial motives in Western rule of law aid, see STEPHEN
HUMPHREYS, THEATRE OF THE RULE OF LAW: TRANSNATIoNAL LEGAL INTERVENTION IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 125-31, 141-42 (2010).
277. Chinese Ambassador Urges Zimbabwe to Respect Investment Protection
Pact, XINHUA (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/tl353378.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/G337-8CKN] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
278. FOCAC, PROGRAMME FOR CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjhlhywj/tl57834.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.c/Y6,JG-6MCK (archived Jan. 10, 2018).
279. See supra Part III.B.1 (detailing the changing Chinese legal education
efforts).
280. FOCAC-Legal Forum, CHINA LAW SOCIETY, http://www.chinalawsociety.
com/Templates/Template2.aspx?ColumnlD=1018 (last visited Feb. 18, 2017) (on file
with author).
281. See supra text accompanying note 162 (discussing Chinese environmental
legal assistance in Vietnam).
282. See Zhang Yiqian, African legal professionals tudy in China due to closer
business ties, GLOBAL TIMES (Jun. 23, 2015) (detailing the growing legal ties between
African and Chinese lawyers).
283. China International Economic and Trade Arbitratio'h Commission
[CIETAC] & Beijing Foreign Studies University [BFSU], An Initiative on Creating
China-Africa Joint Arbitration Center, CHINA LAw SOCIETY (Sept. 21, 2014) (on file
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Chinese legal development assistance is, hence, motivated by
many of the same ideological assumptions and commercial interests
as Western rule of law aid. This reduces the need for the Chinese
government to formulate uniquely "Chinese" alternatives to the
policies promoted under Western rule of law aid. At the same time, it
also appears that Chinese legal development assistance seeks to serve
China's strategic interests, which are defined in direct juxtaposition
with the West. As pointed out above, an aim of Chinese foreign policy
is to resist transnational standards on human rights and the rule of
law imposed by Western countries.284 These efforts are hampered by
the low regard in which many in developing countries hold the
Chinese political system. 285 Legal forums, seminars, and training
courses offer an opportunity for the Chinese government to try and
convince elites in developing countries of the legitimacy of the
Chinese approach to the rule of law and human rights-that is, to
seek to increase the government's "soft power,"286 thereby advancing
Chinese economic and political interests.287 Even if the participants
in these forums and courses will not find the Chinese government's
ambivalent approach to the rule of law and human rights
ideologically appealing, they may accept it is as a legitimate
alternative among many-at least the trains run on time in China.288
It probably helps that descriptions of the Chinese development
experience in Chinese development cooperation typically stay on a
very general level.289
with author). The Chinese government subsequently announced the establishment of
China-Africa Joint Arbitration Centre in Johannesburg in 2015. Arbitration
Foundation of Southern Africa (AFSA), 17 August 2015 Announcement of the China-
Africa Joint Arbitration Centre Johannesburg (CAJAC), http://arbitration.co.zal
pages/CAJAC.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cclTTX2-7GK4] (archived
Oct. 21, 2017).
284. Gu & Carty, supra note 22, at 66.
285. Ofodile, supra note 1, at 576.
286. Chinese media frames legal training courses as attempts to increase
China's "soft power." S. Sarkar, Sino-African Legal Exchanges Look toward Shared
Values from New Era, GLOBAL TIMES (Jun. 3, 2015); Zhang, supra note 282.
Cultivating foreign lawyers who are "friendly to China" is the explicit goal of the Latin
American Legal Training Base; see also supra note 182 and accompanying text
(detailing the development of "Legal Training Bases" to facilitate legal training
programs).
287. Zhang, supra note 282.
288. This was of course a well-known excuse for fascism, which seeks to
highlight the efficiency of fascist regimes. See, e.g., G.A. Borgese, The Intellectual
Origins of Fascism, 1 SOCIAL RES. 458, 471 (1934).
289. A single talk in the Second FOCAC Legal Forum, for instance, addressed
the following topics: (i) Chinese experiences in the construction of the legal system, (ii)
consultation and communication processes in law-making, (iii) mediation in civil
disputes, (iv) public security; (v) integration of scientific, democratic and law-based
administration; and (vi) the "supervision by the CCP, the government and the society."
See FOCAC, THE SECOND FOCAC-LEGAL FORUM CONCLUDING REPORT, supra note 145.
According to one account of this forum, "many of the presentations were not very
inspiring, and mainly summated what the country of the speaker at the podium could
contribute to the cooperation in the field of law and regulation, with most ending with
148 [VOL.51:101
CHINESE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Legal development assistance programs also enable the Chinese
government to provide concrete support for other authoritarian
governments by disseminating information about the Chinese uses of
law to suppress its dissidents. Andrew Nathan has described this as
"the most important technique that authoritarian governments have
learned from one another."2 9 0
B. Incoherent Objectives and Ideological Disagreements
The disparate motives of legal development assistance have not
transformed into coherent development policies either in Western or
in Chinese development cooperation. For instance, the World Bank's
efforts to build institutional rule of law for the regulation of business
activity have clashed with its aim to advance social justice objectives
through legal means.291
The tensions in Chinese legal development assistance are
somewhat different. China's newly assumed role as a capital-
exporting country, which benefits from transnational standards on
investment protection, fits poorly with its longstanding advocacy for
national self-reliance and its opposition to transnational governance
standards. This tension can be observed in Chinese development
policy statements. Chinese government officials have made it known
to African governments that "well-functioning laws and regulations to
assure investors" are a prerequisite for China's continued support to
these countries-while at the same time urging these governments to
keep "to the path of development that suits [their] own national
conditions."292
Similarly, a report by the Chinese State Council's National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) notes that the above-
described Belt and Road Initiative "respects the paths and modes of
development chosen by different countries."293 At the same time, the
report calls for "[u]nimpeded trade" and explains that China "should
speed up investment facilitation, eliminate investment barriers, and
push forward negotiations on bilateral investment protection
a wish to enhance Sino-Africa relations." Sanne van der Lugt, Law and Civil Society
exchanges between China and Africa: Outcomes of the Second FOCAC Legal Forum,
THE CHINA MONITOR 12 (Oct. 2010).
290. Nathan, supra note 256, at 162. The above-described AIBO seminars, for
instance, have introduced foreign officials to Chinese law enforcement and policing
techniques. See text accompanying supra notes 195-196.
291. Santos, supra note 8, at 253, 275-76.
292. Lin Songtian, Director General of the Department for African Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, Address at the Ambassadors Forum: China's
Reform and Opening up & China-Africa Win-Win Cooperation (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.zfhz.org/plus/view.php?aid=12265 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
https://perma.cc/HH38-45MD] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
293. NDRC, supra note 80.
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agreements . . . to protect the lawful rights and interests of
investors."294 As China's own development experience demonstrates,
it is by no means clear that a developing country should make
''unimpeded trade" and investor-friendly laws and trade agreements
its first priority.2 95
In order to articulate a Chinese alternative to the policies
promoted through Western rule of law aid, Chinese development
experts would have to determine what lessons China's development
experience yields to developing countries-and what that experience
was in the first place. When answering these questions, Chinese
development experts may rely on two broad narratives about the role
of law in development. On the one hand, Chinese development
experts may adhere to the stage-based development narrative,
described in Part II.B above. This narrative assigns formal law a
marginal, yet necessary, role in China's economic and social
development, and it effectively offers a legislative roadmap for other
developing countries. According to this narrative, China started with
protectionist laws and a rudimentary legal system and gradually
''created a more liberal foreign trade and business environment for
enterprises" through new legislation.296 This narrative emphasizes
the predictability of economic and social development and it helps
legitimize calls for transparent and efficiently enforced legislation in
China's trading partners.29 7
On the other hand, Chinese development experts may choose to
extol the virtues of legal ambiguity, described in Part II.C above,
without offering a stage-based blueprint for the development process.
From this perspective, there are no predetermined development paths
or legislative roadmaps for development. Instead of maps and
blueprints, the experimental narrative offers as its lesson an ethos of
pragmatism and political will-described as "a preference for
experimentation," "strong leadership," and "an open-minded learning
spirit."298 Whereas the stage-based model provides globally applicable
294. Id.
295. A strong argument can be made that China's economic growth occurred
against the backdrop of government-imposed import barriers, which protected China's
state-run domestic industries from foreign competition. See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE
CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 381 (2007).
296. IPRCC, Trade Facilitation, supra note 169, at 11, 15.
297. Id. at 28; see also CHINA-DAC STUDY GROUP, supra note 90, at 14 (noting
the following: "China's experience supports much of the thinking on the role of small
farmers in Africa's agricultural revolution.... This demands . . . [s]ecuring rights and
interests of small holders in land policies, including the rights and interests of women
farmers.").
298. JPRCC, Development Partnerships, supra note 129, at 7. The narrative on
strong leadership also appears in legal training courses. The above-mentioned
instructor, who lectured against American "value-based diplomacy" in the Third Course
of China-Africa Young Legal Professionals Exchange Program, concluded that an
important aspect of "China's development story" was the necessity to "follow firmly the
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solutions to development issues,2 99 the experimental narrative leads
to the conclusion that "[floreign advice and technology must adapt to
local conditions."3 00 Taken to its conclusion, this narrative justifies
resistance toward all foreign influences, including the stage-based
development model.301
In contrast to the American law and development movement,302
neither of these narratives is associated with a specific form of legal
thought. The stage-based narrative can be used to support both
formal legal reforms and the anti-formalist approach to law,
according to which formal law should yield to pragmatic policies when
substantively more important interests so require. 303 The
experimental narrative provides arguments to resist legal formalism,
but it does not prevent the conclusion that China managed the
sequencing of its reforms well, introducing the right amount of legal
formalism at the right time.304 From both perspectives, enhancing
legal formalism may be a justified development policy.30 5
In addition to these two mainstream narratives, Chinese
development experts may also opt for a self-consciously post-
modernist and critical approach to law and development. This
approach, as promoted by scholars such as Professor Lu An at
Tsinghua University, does not perceive development as a
deterministic stage-based process, nor does it idealize strong
leadership unhinged by rules. Instead, this approach looks for legal
models in the private sector and in (non-Western) legal cultures.3 0 6
leadership of [the] party and [the] government." See supra note 222 and accompanying
text; Handouts from the Third China-Africa Project, supra note 209.
299. IPRCC, Trade Facilitation, supra note 169, at 9 (arguing that "for most
countries trade liberalization can improve poverty reduction").
300. IPRCC, Development Partnerships, supra note 129, at 10.
301. Id. at 21-22.
302. See Trubek, Back to the Future, supra note 144, at 27.
303. Kennedy, The 'Rule of Law," supra note 119, at 106. For the argument hat
clear formal rules (relating to property rights) may be socially and economically
undesirable, see Kennedy, Some Caution about Property Rights as a Recipe For
Economic Development, supra note 11, at 187, 209-12. For the argument that
ambiguous property rights may be economically efficient, see David D. Li, A Theory of
Ambiguous Property Rights in the Transition Economies: The Case of the Chinese Non-
State Sector, 23 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 3 (1996). For a critique of Li's argument, see Clarke,
supra note 126, at 105-06.
304. Kennedy, The "Rule of Law," supra note 119, at 13.
305. This is the effect of Richard Posner's argument in Posner, supra note 123,
at 9. See also Posner, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that "it would be entirely consistent
with [the philosophical stand of] pragmatism not to want judges to be pragmatists")
(emphasis original). The pragmatic attitude is echoed in the World Bank's calls for
pragmatic development policies, which aim to bring about the ideal of the "rule of law."
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 7, at 14. For legal
formalism and pragmatism, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
306. Lu Nan, supra note 6, at 36-37.
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The choice between these narratives and their different versions
is not ideologically neutral. The emphasis on strong leadership,
experimentalism, and native solutions is a politically conservative
position even in China. Such language is attractive to those Chinese
political leaders, scholars, and development experts who are opposed
to the Westernization of China's legal and political institutions.3 0 7 In
contrast, the stage-based narrative, which argues that certain types
of law are necessary at certain stages of development, appeals to
politically moderate Chinese legal scholars and development experts,
some of whom lecture in Chinese legal training courses. Although
moderately reformist, these scholars are not ostracized in Chinese
legal academia and wider society but, instead, occupy key positions in
it.308 Both groups can find support for their views in the Communist
Party's publications on the rule of law.30 9 Also, the self-serving nature
of Chinese foreign policy is a contested matter. At least in private
conversations, some Chinese development experts are concerned
about the self-interested nature of Chinese development
assistance.3 10
The above-described development narratives have specific
implications for Chinese foreign policy goals. This makes choices
between them even more difficult for development experts. The stage-
based narrative, combined with a formalist approach to law,
emphasizes transparency and effectively enforced legislation, thereby
serving China's interests as a capital-exporting country. The
language of legal modernization can also be used to advocate for
predictable laws and regulations, formal property rights, and clearly
defined administrative powers. 311At the same time, the stage-based
narrative supports protectionist measures, and in this sense it is in a
conflict with China's aim to liberalize world trade.3 12 The emphasis on
307. See, e.g., ZHU SULI, FAZHI JI QI BENTU ZIYUAN (RULE OF LAW AND ITS NATIVE
RESOURCES) 22-23 (2d ed. 2004); Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China's Judiciary, 17
DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 533, 539 (2007). Paradoxical as it may be, the conservative
emphasis on experimentation and strong political will does not necessarily lead to the
renunciation of legal formalism. See also Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Reform: China's
Law-Stability Paradox, 143 DAEDALUS 96, 96 (2014); infra text accompanying note 324.
308. As mentioned above, the training courses have given space to moderately
liberal scholars, such as Wang -Liming and the more conservative Zhang Wenxian. See
supra note 202 and accompanying text.
309. For state-sanctioned arguments supporting both positions, see CENTRAL
POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 267. This document describes the
development process both in terms of (Marxist) stage-based eterminism (id. at 15) and
as a context-based phenomenon. Id. at 30.
310. Interview D, supra note 214; Interview L, supra note 148. For a critical
statement of the self-interested nature of legal assistance in China's Belt and Road
Initiative, see Lu Nan, supra note 6, at 38.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 277, 292.
312. For these aims, see NDRC, supra note 80.
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formal law may also do a disservice to Chinese enterprises, which
thrive in informal legal environments.3 1 3
Combined with legal pragmatism, the experimental narrative
better fits the Chinese government's ambivalent attitude toward
legality. This narrative also supports Chinese efforts to resist
Western-imposed transnational standards on the rule of law and
legitimizes Chinese enterprises' freewheeling approach to legality.
Ultimately, however, the experimental narrative amounts to the
rather unsubstantial conclusion that all development is context-
specific.3 14 Nothing in this narrative prevents lawyers in developing
countries from concluding that the establishment of Western-style
legal institutions is the pragmatically desirable policy goal for their
countries.315
C. Exporting Political Conventions-and Taboos
The knowledge-sharing aspect of Chinese legal development
assistance is further complicated by China's idiosyncratic state
structure-ultimately by its one-Party system-and by the specific
political ideology that accompanies this structure.316 In short, China's
domestic ideological conventions and taboos make it difficult for
Chinese development experts to openly discuss the Chinese
government's actual uses of law, even if information about such
practices would be welcome for China's authoritarian development
partners. 317 The secrecy with which the Chinese government and
Chinese development experts treat legal development assistance
programs is symptomatic of such taboos.
Again, it needs to be noted that the obfuscation of domestic
practices in rule of law aid is not unique to Chinese development
assistance. For instance, the case can be made that the "US legal
system is seriously deficient" in meeting the World Bank's criteria for
the rule of law.31 8 Nevertheless, Chinese legal development assistance
313. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
314. IPRCC, Development Partnerships, supra note 129, at 10. As David Trubek
has pointed out, a significant strand of law and development scholarship prioritizes
context and experimentation. Trubek, Law and Development, supra note 252, at 325-
27.
315. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 29 (1995) (noting that political
liberalism suits pragmatism).
316. See generally DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA'S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY
AND ADAPTATION (2008) (detailing the intricacies of the Chinese state structure as it
impacts analysis of Chinese legal issues).
317. Nathan, supra note 256, at 162.
318. The limited provision of free legal services in the United States is
detrimental to realizing the equal access to justice, which the World Bank defines as
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must grapple with a form of post-totalitarian ideology, which
comprises a considerable element of informal, extra-legal use of power
in a legal system that is formally described as autonomous in the
concrete adjudication of cases. In reality, politically sensitive cases in
China are commonly decided outside the formal legal system.3 1 9 A
number of political dissidents are held in extra-legal detention
centers without the benefit of the procedural rights supposedly
guaranteed by China's formal legal system.320The people's courts
cannot compel powerful state organs to comply with their decisions
without obtaining the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's)
endorsement.3 21 Violations of law by government officials, such as the
unlawful expropriation of land use rights, are endemic.3 22 Perhaps
most important, the Chinese development process builds on an
ambivalent approach to legality, which frequently allows private
citizens and companies to experiment with illegal and legally
ambiguous practices.3 2 3
Information about the actual workings of the Chinese party-state
is mostly repressed in Chinese policy statements on the rule of law.
Prominent pronouncements on the rule of law by the CCP do not
condone extra-legal uses of power or violations of law by government
officials and party cadres. On the contrary, such pronouncements
instruct Chinese government officials and party cadres to "handle
matters strictly according to the law" and to "perform duties strictly
according to law." 324
The emphasis on legality in the Party's statements on the rule of
law is understandable. The CCP controls the Chinese legislative
processes and wishes to see laws enforced uniformly throughout
China.325 At the same time, the CCP is unwilling to allow the Chinese
judiciary to hold the Party accountable for violations of the law.326 As
a consequence, the Party approaches the rule of law in a paradoxical
manner. On the one hand, it seeks to establish an autonomous legal
one of the criteria of the rule of law. KENNETH WINSTON, ETHICS IN PUBLIC LIFE: GOOD
PRACTITIONERS IN A RISING ASIA 143-45 (2015).
319. EVA PILS, CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE
80-91 (2015).
320. FLORA SAPIO, SOVEREIGN POWER AND THE LAW IN CHINA 15, 24 (2010).
321. Ling Li, The Chinese Communist Party and People's Courts: Judicial
Dependence in China, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 65-66 (2016). To be sure, Chinese people's
courts are not without any political power. See Nicholas C. Howson, Judicial
Independence and Company Law in the Shanghai People's Courts, 1992-2008, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 134, 138-39 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010) (noting
that people's courts are able to rule against political actors in corporate cases);
Benjamin B. Liebman, China's Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620, 626 (2007)
(noting that people's courts are increasingly likely to use legal arguments to resist
external interference).
322. Pils, supra note 143, at 288.
323. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
324. CENTRAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMMITIEE, supra note 267, at 109.
325. Id. at 132-35.
326. Ling Li, supra note 321, at 71-72.
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system-that is, the supremacy of the law, including judicial
independence in the concrete adjudication of cases.3 27 On the other
hand, it seeks to destabilize this autonomy through various means.
For instance, the Party's documents on the rule of law include
suggestive statements about the "leadership of the Party" and the
inseparability of politics from adjudication. 328 Such statements
strengthen the Communist Party cadres' informal knowledge about
desired power relations between Party organs and the judiciary.32 9
In theory, some of the elements of the CCP's paradoxical
approach to law could be exported to foreign countries, just as the
Leninist party-state was exported to China in the 1920s.3 30 A Chinese
development expert could explain to foreign lawyers that the CCP has
found a somewhat paradoxical approach to the rule of law helpful for
maintaining its power and reaching its other policy goals. Political
dissidents, the development expert could point out, are handled
outside formal legal proceedings, and the general population is kept
satisfied with a limited amount of rights protection, while its political
expectations are kept low by implausible and cynical public
statements about the rule of law.
Officials from authoritarian countries might find such exchanges
genuinely valuable,3 3' but they would not do much to increase China's
soft power among the liberal elites in developing countries. Moreover,
it would be difficult for Chinese development experts to explain what
the Party's actual relationship to formal law is, given the diffuse and
informal nature of this relationship. 332 Most important, frank
accounts of the Party's actual uses of law would be contrary to the
Party's own ideological statements about the supposed role of the
legal system in China. 333 Because of such ideological pressures,
Chinese development experts are tempted to produce highly idealized
accounts of Chinese law for foreign consumption.334 To the extent that
327. CENTRAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 267, at 10-11, 203-
04.
328. Id. at 11, 30.
329. See SEPPANEN, supra note 8, at 199-200.
330. BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ, CHINESE COMMUNISM AND THE RISE OF MAO 31-32
(1966). For the Leninist party-state model, see Larry Cata Backer, Party, People,
Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese
State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT'L L. J. 332, 358-59 (2012).
331. See supra text accompanying note 290.
332. Suli, Political Parties in China's Judiciary, supra note 307, at 537.
333. See supra notes 322 and 325.
334. An IPRCC report, for instance, asserts rather improbably that "China
Customs has established a perfect intellectual property rights enforcement system."
IPRCC, Trade Facilitation, supra note 169, at 15.
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references to the Communist Party are made in Chinese development
policy documents, they are very cursory.3 35
In conclusion, it is understandable why some Chinese
development experts believe that the Chinese development
experience cannot be exported to foreign countries. To quote an
IPRCC report, "[t]here is no 'China model' that could be replicated
easily." 336 Some development experts interviewed for this Article
experience the uncertainties surrounding the development aid
narratives as confusing and troubling.3 37 Others are simultaneously
overwhelmed and amused by the notion that Chinese development
experts are now expected to advice other countries on the relationship
between law and development when this relationship is an open
question at home.338
In lieu of a coherently articulated Chinese approach to law and
development, Chinese development experts and government officials
are left to reproduce many of the same vague and poorly justified
assumptions about law and development hat mark much of Western
rule of law aid. As a report on Chinese development assistance
acknowledges, "China does not have its own understandings or
discourses of development, independent from Western historical,
political and economic discourse." 339 Making Chinese legal
development assistance more ideologically explicit will not solve this
issue because the ideological confusion is already present in the
Communist Party's ideological statements.
Even without a coherent message, Chinese legal development
assistance has disrupted the global circulation of knowledge about
law and development. The questions being asked under the auspices
of Chinese legal development assistance may well generate a new
335. The aforementioned IPRCC report outlining lessons from China's
development experience notes in a footnote that "China has two sets of institutions: the
government/administrative institutions which have thousand years of history, and [the
CCP] system which also runs through central, provincial and local levels." The
authority for this statement is Professor Kenneth Lieberthal's textbook on Chinese
politics. The authors state that they will not discuss the role of the Communist Party
further in the report, since this would not be "relevant to developing countries." IPRCC,
Development Partnerships, supra note 129, at 11-12. For the textbook, see KENNETH
LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM (2nd ed. 2003).
Anecdotally, it appears that at least some foreign participants in Chinese legal training
courses are left confused about the role of the Party in the legal system. Telephone
interview, supra note 208.
336. IPRCC, Development Partnerships, upra note 129, at 12.
337. Interview D, supra note 214; Interview F, supra note 214.
338. Interview L, supra note 148; see also Benjamin L. Liebman, Authoritarian
Justice in China: Is There a "Chinese Model'?, in THE BEIJING CONSENSUS?, supra note
15, at 248 (cautioning against "thinking that the Chinese approach [to legal
development] will travel well" and noting that "the central question is whether the
Chinese Model can work in China").
339. ZHANG, GU & CHEN, supra note 1, at 3.
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tradition of enquiry (if not coherent answers).340 Moreover, Chinese
engagement with the legal profession in developing countries may
well change the expectations that such lawyers have regarding legal
development cooperation. In particular, the openly self-interested,
commercial nature of Chinese legal development assistance stands
out in contrast to Western rationalizations of rule-of-law aid, which
typically perceive the self-interested nature of such aid an
embarrassment. 341 The narrative of the mutually beneficial,
commercial nature of this assistance conveys a sense of respect to
foreign lawyers, which clearly has been missing from the more
missionary Western rule of law programs.34 2
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Chinese government's efforts to provide legal development
assistance to developing countries suggest that China is no longer
willing to be solely at the receiving end of rule of law aid. As is the
case with many Western donors, the Chinese government advocates
investor-friendly laws and trade agreements to protect Chinese
investments abroad. The Chinese government also offers various
legal capacity-building programs to foreign lawyers. These programs
aim to introduce Chinese law to foreign lawyers and to persuade
them of the legitimacy of heterodox alternatives to Western notions
about law and development.
Unsurprisingly, Chinese efforts in legal development assistance
are riddled with tensions. On the one hand, Chinese development
experts advance often repeated (but elusive) Western notions about
the importance of "the rule of law" for the development process. On
the other hand, Chinese development experts extol experimentation,
at times suggesting that tolerance for legally ambiguous practices is
beneficial for economic development.
Amid these tensions, there are some consistent themes. In
contrast to their Western colleagues, and despite the pressures to
advocate investor-friendly legal reforms, Chinese development
340. For traditions of enquiry, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?
WHICH RATIONALITY? 326-27 (1988). This book has inspired the name of this article.
See also Dowdle & Prado, supra note 36, at 41-42 (noting that the dialogue about the
"Beijing Consensus" may result in "new forms of knowledge").
341. WINSTON, supra note 318, at 141.
342. See Ofodile, supra note 1, at 541 (describing the promise of a win-win
relationship with China a "tantalizing" prospect for African policy-makers). For an
official Chinese version of the mutual beneficial nature of Chinese aid, see The Eight
Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries, supra note
110.
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experts are generally hesitant to prescribe specific lessons to
developing countries. In particular, it appears that no specific
"Chinese model" of law and development is promoted in Chinese
foreign development assistance. This is partly a political strategy.
Chinese development experts and government officials see virtue in
remaining ideologically noninvasive in their foreign dealings.
However, this Article has also argued that the CCP's domestic uses of
law rest on repressed, largely informal knowledge about the desired
relationship between the legal system and the Communist Party.
This approach lends itself poorly to exportation, even if there was
demand for information about Chinese-style authoritarianism. Still,
the very experience of encountering a tentative and incoherent legal
discourse in the material grandeur of Beijing and Shanghai sends a
clear message about the relative unimportance of law for
development.
